Not much trouble for ultra-externalism

That is, although I agree that there is something it is like to, say, see that there are nettles over there, I am much inclined to the views (i) that one conveys what it is like to be in such a state by stating its representational content as specified by the that-clause; and (ii) that there is no 'inner' phenomenal or 'raw feely' residue or associated visual sensation which can vary independently of this representational contentI (see [3], ?VI; [4], chaps. 5-6; [5], chaps. 2, 6). Thus I am very sceptical about a certain kind of inverted spectrum or 'transformation' possibility canvassed by Kirk ([1], passim; [2], ?II). Kirk's main effort in [2] goes into trying to develop a straight counterexample to (UE), based on the transformation idea. But it seems, as we shall see, that the conclusion is intended to generalize to refute the likes of (UE/v) also: and Kirk certainly does not accept (UE/v) (thus [1], pp. 23-9). In any case, even if this is not the intention, interested parties clearly should wonder whether Kirk's conclusion does so generalize. I shall suggest that his argument for rejecting (UE) is weak, and that he gives no reason at all for supposing that its conclusion generalizes. Here is the heart of Kirk's description of the putative counterexample: