Why Do People Veto? An Experimental Analysis of the Valuation and the Consequences of Varying Degrees of Veto Power

By vetoing one question mutually efficient agreements. On the other hand, the threat of vetoing may prevent exploitation. Based on a generalization of ultimatum bargaining (Suleiman, 1996), we first elicit the responders' certainty equivalents for three different degrees of veto power. Afterwards the corresponding bargaining rule is implemented. The experimental data reveal that proposers are afraid of more veto power, and that responders only care about commanding veto power but not its degree.

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