Custer and Cognition

Abstract : Opinions are sharply divided about whether George Armstrong Custer was a brilliant tactician or a compulsive risktaker. Was the massacre at the Little Bighorn the result of his misfortune or his audacity? This article does not aim to settle the argument between admirers and critics. Rather, it uses a new explanatory model of cognition in combat to explore what Custer's case suggests about decisionmaking in today's era of networked warfare. How does this flamboyant 19th-century cavalry officer relate to information-age military decisionmaking? After all, Custer's "bandwidth"--binoculars and scouts--was negligible by today's standards. Yet there are good reasons to consider his experience. First, 19th-century cavalry action was a precursor of the fast-breaking distributed warfare that characterizes the network era. Cavalry-type missions (reconnaissance, deep strike, disruption) and qualities (speed, flexibility) are relevant in current warfare. The cavalry had to respond to the unfamiliar, unclear, and unanticipated. More than those who directed set-piece infantry maneuvers and artillery bombardments, cavalry commanders had to make prompt decisions under fluid and ambiguous conditions, often without guidance from higher authority, much like tactical-level officers in networked warfare.