Gradations of Democracy? Empirical Tests of Alternative Conceptualizations

measured. Should scholars use intermediate categories to measure differences between democratic and nondemocratic regimes? In a series of influential studies, Przeworski, Alvarez, Cheibub, and Limongi describe this practice as "ludicrous" and insist on dichotomous measures (Alvarez et al. 1996, 21; Przeworski et al. 1996; Przeworski and Limongi 1997, 178-179). Their position, which is shared by other prominent scholars (e.g., Linz 1975, 184-185; Huntington 1991, 11-12), is surprising. An insistence on dichotomous measures appears to neglect the advances in data collection and analysis that would allow for the more precise measurement of gradations (Bollen and Jackman 1989, 616-619). Also, their position seems insensitive to the incremental, and sometimes partial, process that characterizes many democratic transitions. Thus, dichotomous measures appear both methodologically regressive and lacking in face validity. This commitment to dichotomies in light of what seem like clear disadvantages has widened an important division among scholars about the conceptualization of democracy. Przeworski et al.'s argument, which is representative of the dichotomous view, rests on two logically independent claims-one about validity and one about reliability. Their validity claim is that democracy is first a question of kind before it is one of degree, and we cannot measure the degree of democracy across different "kinds" of regimes (Alvarez et al. 1996, 21-22).1 The solution, according to this logic, amounts to the well-known social science maxim to classify before quantifying (e.g., Sartori 1970, 1036-1040). Their reliability claim is that, even ifit made sense to measure gradations of democracy, dichotomous measures would be preferable because they contain less measurement error than do graded measures (Alvarez et al. 1996, 31). In sum, they argue that efforts to