This essay is an analysis of the implications of misperception—the inaccurate assessment by one actor of the other actor's preferences—in international relations. The author finds that misperception cannot affect the choice of an actor with a dominant strategy, although it can affect that actor's expectations as long as both actors are self-interested and seek to maximize their own payoffs. Misperception creates conflict only in a narrowly circumscribed range of situations, and even then the misperceived actor has no incentive to mask its true preferences. An actor who deceives does so in order to facilitate coordination through the other's misperception of its preferences, and thus to avoid conflict—not to create it. Three possible outcomes can occur when both actors misperceive, and in only one of the three does misperception cause conflict that would otherwise be avoidable. In a formal analysis of the limited set of situations that characterize international crises, misperception is found neither to create conflict nor to lead to the escalation of crisis into war.
[1]
R. White.
Misperception in the Arab-Israeli Conflict
,
1977
.
[2]
R. Jervis.
Perception and misperception in international politics
,
1976
.
[3]
Kenneth N. Waltz,et al.
Theory of International Politics
,
1979
.
[4]
M. Kaplan.
Towards professionalism in international theory : macrosystem analysis
,
1979
.
[5]
Ernest R. May,et al.
"Lessons" of the Past: The Use and Misuse of History in American Foreign Policy
,
1974
.
[6]
P. Diesing,et al.
Conflict Among Nations: Bargaining, Decision Making, and System Structure in International Crises
,
1978
.
[7]
L. Farrar.
The limits of choice: July 1914 reconsidered
,
1972
.
[8]
Steven J. Brams,et al.
Deception in 2 × 2 Games
,
1977
.
[9]
C. Hosoya.
Miscalculations in Deterrent Policy: Japanese-U.S. Relations, 1938-1941
,
1968
.
[10]
O. Holsti.
Crisis, escalation, war
,
1972
.
[11]
Ralph K. White,et al.
Nobody wanted war : misperception in Vietnam and other wars
,
1968
.