The roles of information deficits and identity threat in the prevalence of misperceptions

ABSTRACT Why do so many Americans hold misperceptions? We examine two factors that contribute to the prevalence of these beliefs. First, presenting correct information should reduce misperceptions, especially if provided in a clear and compelling format. We therefore test the effect of graphical information, which may be especially effective in facilitating belief updating about changes in quantities over time. In some cases, though, people may reject information because it threatens their worldview or self-concept – a mechanism that can be revealed by affirming individuals’ self-worth, which could make them more willing to acknowledge uncomfortable facts. We test both mechanisms jointly. In three experiments, we find that providing information in graphical form reduces misperceptions. A third study shows that this effect is greater than for equivalent textual information. Our findings for self-affirmation are more equivocal. We find limited evidence that self-affirmation can help diminish misperceptions when no other information is provided, but it does not consistently increase willingness to accept corrective information as previous research in social psychology would suggest. These results suggest that misperceptions are caused by a lack of information as well as psychological threat, but that these factors may interact in ways that are not yet well understood.

[1]  Mathew D. McCubbins,et al.  The Democratic Dilemma: Can Citizens Learn What They Need to Know? , 1998 .

[2]  Geoffrey L. Cohen,et al.  The psychology of change: self-affirmation and social psychological intervention. , 2014, Annual review of psychology.

[3]  Toby Bolsen,et al.  Counteracting the Politicization of Science , 2015 .

[4]  D. Binder On the variances of asymptotically normal estimators from complex surveys , 1983 .

[5]  Gregory A. Huber,et al.  Disagreement and the Avoidance of Political Discussion: Aggregate Relationships and Differences across Personality Traits , 2012 .

[6]  Michael D. Buhrmester,et al.  Amazon's Mechanical Turk , 2011, Perspectives on psychological science : a journal of the Association for Psychological Science.

[7]  Clayton R. Critcher,et al.  Self-Affirmations Provide a Broader Perspective on Self-Threat , 2015, Personality & social psychology bulletin.

[8]  Charles S. Taber,et al.  Motivated Skepticism in the Evaluation of Political Beliefs , 2006 .

[9]  James N. Druckman,et al.  How Frames Can Undermine Support for Scientific Adaptations: Politicization and the Status-Quo Bias , 2014 .

[10]  Peter H. Ditto,et al.  Biased Assimilation, Attitude Polarization, and Affect in Reactions to Stereotype-Relevant Scientific Information , 1997 .

[11]  David G. Rand,et al.  The online laboratory: conducting experiments in a real labor market , 2010, ArXiv.

[12]  P. Sol Hart,et al.  Boomerang Effects in Science Communication , 2012, Commun. Res..

[13]  M. Zanna,et al.  An affirmed self and an open mind: Self-affirmation and sensitivity to argument strength. , 2004 .

[14]  A. McCright,et al.  The Politicization of Climate Change and Polarization in the American Public's Views of Global Warming, 2001–2010 , 2011 .

[15]  R. Aslin,et al.  Statistical learning of higher-order temporal structure from visual shape sequences. , 2002, Journal of experimental psychology. Learning, memory, and cognition.

[16]  Iris Vessey,et al.  Cognitive Fit: A Theory‐Based Analysis of the Graphs Versus Tables Literature* , 1991 .

[17]  Geoffrey L. Cohen,et al.  Accepting Threatening Information: Self–Affirmation and the Reduction of Defensive Biases , 2002 .

[18]  Delli Carpini,et al.  An Overview of the State of Citizens' Knowledge About Politics , 2005 .

[19]  Piero Stanig Political polarization in retrospective economic evaluations during recessions and recoveries , 2013 .

[20]  A. Gelman,et al.  The Difference Between “Significant” and “Not Significant” is not Itself Statistically Significant , 2006 .

[21]  Benjamin A. Lyons Unbiasing Information Search and Processing through Personal and Social Identity Mechanisms , 2016 .

[22]  S. Schneider,et al.  Expert credibility in climate change , 2010, Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences.

[23]  Z. Kunda,et al.  The case for motivated reasoning. , 1990, Psychological bulletin.

[24]  Edward G. Carmines,et al.  The Two Faces of Issue Voting , 1980, American Political Science Review.

[25]  Martin Gilens,et al.  Political Ignorance and Collective Policy Preferences , 2001, American Political Science Review.

[26]  James A. Crowder,et al.  The Psychology of Change , 2013 .

[27]  John Sides Stories , Science , and Public Opinion about the Estate Tax , 2010 .

[28]  C. Steele The Psychology of Self-Affirmation: Sustaining the Integrity of the Self , 1988 .

[29]  B. Scholl,et al.  The Automaticity of Visual Statistical Learning Statistical Learning , 2005 .

[30]  M. Prior,et al.  You Cannot be Serious: The Impact of Accuracy Incentives on Partisan Bias in Reports of Economic Perceptions , 2015 .

[31]  Steven Kull,et al.  Misperceptions, the Media, and the Iraq War , 2003 .

[32]  Brendan Nyhan,et al.  Why the "Death Panel" Myth Wouldn't Die: Misinformation in the Health Care Reform Debate , 2010 .

[33]  Leif D. Nelson,et al.  Do Messages about Health Risks Threaten the Self? Increasing the Acceptance of Threatening Health Messages Via Self-Affirmation , 2000 .

[34]  D. Rucinski The Nature and Origins of Mass Opinion. , 1994 .

[35]  J. Hart. On Educating the Public. , 1961, Science.

[36]  F. Hernández The democratic dilemma , 2009 .

[37]  B. Nyhan,et al.  When Corrections Fail: The Persistence of Political Misperceptions , 2010 .

[38]  D. Kahan Climate-Science Communication and the Measurement Problem , 2015 .

[39]  W. Klein,et al.  Experimental manipulations of self-affirmation: A systematic review , 2006 .

[40]  Jeffery. M. Zacks,et al.  Bars and lines: A study of graphic communication , 1999, Memory & cognition.

[41]  Andrew Gelman,et al.  Let's Practice What We Preach , 2002 .

[42]  Geoffrey L. Cohen,et al.  The Psychology of Self‐defense: Self‐Affirmation Theory , 2006 .

[43]  Adam J. Berinsky,et al.  Evaluating Online Labor Markets for Experimental Research: Amazon.com's Mechanical Turk , 2012, Political Analysis.

[44]  L. Ross,et al.  Biased Assimilation and Attitude Polarization: The Effects of Prior Theories on Subsequently Considered Evidence , 1979 .

[45]  John Sides Stories or Science? Facts, Frames, and Policy Attitudes , 2016 .

[46]  A. Gerber,et al.  Partisan Bias in Factual Beliefs About Politics , 2013 .

[47]  Larry M. Bartels Beyond the Running Tally: Partisan Bias in Political Perceptions , 2002 .

[48]  Stefano Spaccapietra,et al.  Introduction to Part I , 2019, Modular Ontologies.

[49]  Claude M. Steele,et al.  When Beliefs Yield to Evidence: Reducing Biased Evaluation by Affirming the Self , 2000 .

[50]  Joachim Meyer,et al.  Information Structure and the Relative Efficacy of Tables and Graphs , 1999, Hum. Factors.

[51]  R. Rich,et al.  Misinformation and the Currency of Democratic Citizenship , 2000, The Journal of Politics.

[52]  J. Citrin,et al.  How Large the Huddled Masses? The Causes and Consequences of Public Misperceptions about Immigrant Populations , 2007 .

[53]  R. M. Hutchins The democratic dilemma , 1951 .

[54]  Edward E. Smith,et al.  A disconfirmation bias in the evaluation of arguments. , 1996 .

[55]  John G. Bullock Experiments on partisanship and public opinion , 2007 .

[56]  Scott L. Althaus Information Effects in Collective Preferences , 1998, American Political Science Review.

[57]  G. Burton,et al.  Let's Practice What We Preach , 1983 .

[58]  J. N. Washburne An experimental study of various graphic, tabular, and textual methods of presenting quantitative material , 1927 .

[59]  David P. Redlawsk Hot Cognition or Cool Consideration? Testing the Effects of Motivated Reasoning on Political Decision Making , 2002, The Journal of Politics.