Proposal for a Contingency Debt Sustainability Framework

We argue that the New Debt Sustainability Framework (NDSF) of the World Bank and IMF is centered on the Country Policy and Institutional Assessment (CPIA) to suit the aid allocation mechanism of the International Development Association (IDA), but fails to deal effectively with the economic vulnerability of low-income countries. Instead, we propose a Contingency Debt Sustainability Framework (CDSF), which identifies the sources of vulnerability and compensates for exogenous shock and trend factors. Without giving rise to significant moral hazard implications, the CDSF is thus suitable to effectively shield low-income countries from the main external causes undermining their achievement of debt sustainability.

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