Cyber-Physical Security: A Game Theory Model of Humans Interacting Over Control Systems

Recent years have seen increased interest in the design and deployment of smart grid devices and control algorithms. Each of these smart communicating devices represents a potential access point for an intruder spurring research into intruder prevention and detection. However, no security measures are complete, and intruding attackers will compromise smart grid devices leading to the attacker and the system operator interacting via the grid and its control systems. The outcome of these machine-mediated human-human interactions will depend on the design of the physical and control systems mediating the interactions. If these outcomes can be predicted via simulation, they can be used as a tool for designing attack-resilient grids and control systems. However, accurate predictions require good models of not just the physical and control systems, but also of the human decision making. In this manuscript, we present an approach to develop such tools, i.e., models of the decisions of the cyber-physical intruder who is attacking the systems and the system operator who is defending it, and demonstrate its usefulness for design.

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