Adaptive Risk Management of Gene Drive Experiments

Emerging technologies in the life sciences call for new models of biosafety risk management. We examine the question of how to address new developments in the life sciences and biosciences in a bottom-up manner—that is, from the concrete level of biosafety practice with a focus on the risk management and risk assessment of emerging technologies in the biology laboratory. We use research on “gene drives” as an example of challenging work with new constructs that have major biosafety implications for the work in the laboratory and beyond. Gene drives are intended for use in ecosystems and require, at an early stage, the consideration of potential future biosafety, biosecurity, and societal impact. We argue for an integrative approach, a truly collaborative model that involves scientists, biosafety officers, institutional leadership, and ethics consultants, with the aim of maximizing safety as well as scientific progress.

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