论文信息 - Computing the optimal weights in a utilitarian model of apportionment

Computing the optimal weights in a utilitarian model of apportionment

We consider a model of optimal apportionment in which individuals derive utility from the probability that the collective decision matches their own will. We suggest an iterative algorithm for the numerical optimization of the utilitarian social welfare function and apply it to the case of the European Parliament. Our results confirm that the optimal system of weights exhibits a form of degressive proportionality.

Rafael Treibich | Antonin Macé | Antonin Macé | Rafael Treibich

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