Ownership, Strategy and Performance: Is the Dichotomy Sufficient?

Do ownership characteristics moderate strategy, or is ownership a strategic vari able in itself? This is the research question that motivates this study. In order to shed light on this issue, Berle and Means' (1932) separation of ownership and control thesis as well as Demsetz and Lehn's (1985) symmetrical model of owner ship are empirically evaluated in the Canadian context. The findings indicate that neither framework is sufficient to explain the strategic conduct and profitability of firms operating in Canada. It is suggested that a broader based approach incorporating government and foreign ownership distinctions would be more promising avenues for future research than those which solely consider Berle and Means' (1932) dichotomy.

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