Effectiveness of Preference Elicitation in Combinatorial Auctions
暂无分享,去创建一个
[1] Tuomas Sandholm,et al. Computationally Limited Agents in Auctions , 2001 .
[2] Tuomas Sandholm. eMediator: A Next Generation Electronic Commerce Server , 2002, Comput. Intell..
[3] Y. Shoham,et al. Towards a Universal Test Suite forCombinatorial Au tion , 2000 .
[4] Noam Nisan,et al. Bidding and allocation in combinatorial auctions , 2000, EC '00.
[5] David Levine,et al. CABOB: A Fast Optimal Algorithm for Combinatorial Auctions , 2001, IJCAI.
[6] Michael P. Wellman,et al. AkBA: a progressive, anonymous-price combinatorial auction , 2000, EC '00.
[7] Trey Smith,et al. Constructing and Clearing Combinatorial Exchanges Using Preference Elicitation , 2002 .
[8] Tuomas Sandholm,et al. Preference elicitation in combinatorial auctions , 2001, AAMAS '02.
[9] Tuomas Sandholm,et al. Issues in Computational Vickrey Auctions , 2000, Int. J. Electron. Commer..
[10] M. Rothkopf,et al. Why Are Vickrey Auctions Rare? , 1990, Journal of Political Economy.
[11] Hal R. Varian,et al. Economic Mechanism Design for Computerized Agents , 1995, USENIX Workshop on Electronic Commerce.
[12] Moshe Tennenholtz. Some Tractable Combinatorial Auctions , 2000, AAAI/IAAI.
[13] Craig Boutilier,et al. Bidding Languages for Combinatorial Auctions , 2001, IJCAI.
[14] David C. Parkes,et al. Iterative Combinatorial Auctions: Theory and Practice , 2000, AAAI/IAAI.
[15] Tuomas Sandholm,et al. Deliberation in Equilibrium: Bargaining in Computationally Complex Problems , 2000, AAAI/IAAI.
[16] T. Sandholm,et al. Costly valuation computation in auctions , 2001 .
[17] Arne Andersson,et al. Integer programming for combinatorial auction winner determination , 2000, Proceedings Fourth International Conference on MultiAgent Systems.
[18] Tuomas Sandholm,et al. eMediator: A Next Generation Electronic Commerce Server , 1999, AGENTS '00.
[19] Yoav Shoham,et al. Taming the Computational Complexity of Combinatorial Auctions: Optimal and Approximate Approaches , 1999, IJCAI.
[20] Ronald M. Harstad,et al. Computationally Manageable Combinational Auctions , 1998 .
[21] Tuomas Sandholm,et al. An Implementation of the Contract Net Protocol Based on Marginal Cost Calculations , 1993, AAAI.
[22] Tuomas Sandholm,et al. Coherent Pricing of Efficient Allocations in Combinatorial Economies , 2002 .
[23] Phz eMKMLafgZ,et al. iBundle: An Efficient Ascending Price Bundle Auction , 1999 .
[24] N. Nisan,et al. The Communication Complexity of Efficient Allocation Problems , 2002 .
[25] Tuomas Sandholm,et al. Differential -Revelation VCG Mechanisms for Combinatorial Auctions , 2002, AMEC.
[26] William Vickrey,et al. Counterspeculation, Auctions, And Competitive Sealed Tenders , 1961 .
[27] Kevin Barraclough,et al. I and i , 2001, BMJ : British Medical Journal.
[28] Tuomas Sandholm,et al. Algorithm for optimal winner determination in combinatorial auctions , 2002, Artif. Intell..
[29] David C. Parkes,et al. Preventing Strategic Manipulation in Iterative Auctions: Proxy Agents and Price-Adjustment , 2000, AAAI/IAAI.
[30] Tuomas Sandholm,et al. Partial-revelation VCG mechanism for combinatorial auctions , 2002, AAAI/IAAI.
[31] E. H. Clarke. Multipart pricing of public goods , 1971 .
[32] Sven de Vries,et al. Linear Programming and Vickrey Auctions , 2001 .
[33] Theodore Groves,et al. Incentives in Teams , 1973 .
[34] Sven de Vries,et al. Combinatorial Auctions: A Survey , 2003, INFORMS J. Comput..
[35] David C. Parkes,et al. Optimal Auction Design for Agents with Hard Valuation Problems , 1999, Agent Mediated Electronic Commerce.