Comparing Interest Group PAC Contributions to House and Senate Incumbents, 1980-1986

Most work on the allocation patterns of campaign contributions by interest groups focuses on the relative productivity of legislators' effort in serving each group. Short time-series and cross-sectional studies of PAC activity have been done for the House of Representatives and the Senate separately, but no study has used (1) longer time series data or (2) made explicit comparisons among interest group (corporations, unions, and trade associations) activities, considering (3) differences in the time series pattern of groups across the two chambers. We integrate all three perspectives here, using data covering the 1980-1986 election cycles. The results represent preliminary estimates of the dollar value to interest groups of the personal and institutional characteristics of legislators, where these characteristics are allowed for the first time to vary across chambers.

[1]  Michael C. Munger,et al.  The impact of legislator attributes on union PAC campaign contributions , 1992 .

[2]  L. Langbein.  Money and Access: Some Empirical Evidence , 1986, The Journal of Politics.

[3]  A. Wilhite.  Union PAC contributions and legislative voting , 1988 .

[4]  J. Tobin.  Estimation of Relationships for Limited Dependent Variables , 1958 .

[5]  G. Durden,et al.  Determining Legislative Preferences on the Minimum Wage: An Economic Approach , 1976, Journal of Political Economy.

[6]  W. Welch.  Campaign Contributions and Legislative Voting: Milk Money and Dairy Price Supports , 1982 .

[7]  Michael C. Munger,et al.  Committee Assignments, Constituent Preferences, and Campaign Contributions , 1991 .

[8]  J. Grenzke.  Candidate Attributes and Pac Contributions , 1989 .

[9]  J. R. Wright.  PACs, Contributions, and Roll Calls: An Organizational Perspective , 1985, American Political Science Review.

[10]  Henry W. ChappellJr..  Campaign contributions and voting on the cargo preference bill: A comparison of simultaneous models , 1981 .

[11]  Randall B. Ripley,et al.  Power in the Senate. , 1973 .

[12]  L. Langbein,et al.  The Political Efficacy of Lobbying and Money: Gun Control in the U. S. House, 1986 , 1990 .

[13]  Richard F. Fenno.  Home Style : House Members in Their Districts , 1978 .

[14]  D. Evans.  Oil PACs and Aggressive Contribution Strategies , 1988, The Journal of Politics.

[15]  M. Munger,et al.  Allocation patterns of PAC monies: The U.S. Senate , 1990 .

[16]  David R. Mayhew.  Congress: The Electoral Connection , 1975 .

[17]  Cletus C. Coughlin.  Domestic Content Legislation: House Voting and the Economic Theory of Regulation , 1985 .

[18]  S. Peltzman.  Constituent Interest and Congressional Voting , 1984, The Journal of Law and Economics.

[19]  J. Schroedel.  Campaign Contributions and Legislative Outcomes , 1986 .

[20]  Richard F. Fenno.  Congressmen in committees , 1973 .

[21]  K. T. Poole,et al.  The Revealed Preferences of Political Action Committees , 1987 .

[22]  M. Munger.  A simple test of the thesis that committee jurisdictions shape corporate PAC contributions , 1989 .

[23]  Richard L. Hall,et al.  Buying Time: Moneyed Interests and the Mobilization of Bias in Congressional Committees , 1990, American Political Science Review.

[24]  J. D. Gopoian,et al.  What Makes PACs Tick? An Analysis of the Allocation Patterns of Economic Interest Groups , 1984 .

[25]  H. N. Wieman,et al.  The organization of interests , 1985 .

[26]  B. Goff,et al.  On the (mis)measurement of legislator ideology and shirking , 1993 .

[27]  Paul H. Rubin,et al.  Congressman, Constituents, and Contributors , 1982 .

[28]  Ross K. Baker.  House and Senate , 1989 .

[29]  J. Kau,et al.  The impact of labor unions on the passage of economic legislation , 1981 .

[30]  Asghar Zardkoohi,et al.  Congressional support for unions’ positions across diverse legislation , 1988 .

[31]  L. Langbein.  PACs, lobbies and political conflict: The case of gun control , 1993 .

[32]  H. Chappell.  Campaign Contributions and Congressional Voting: A Simultaneous Probit-Tobit Model , 1982 .

[33]  Michael C. Munger,et al.  Legislators and Interest Groups: How Unorganized Interests Get Represented , 1986, American Political Science Review.

[34]  K. T. Poole,et al.  Patterns of political action committee contributions to the 1980 campaigns for the United States House of Representatives , 1985 .

[35]  J. Grenzke.  PACs and the Congressional Supermarket: The Currency is Complex , 1989 .

[36]  J. R. Wright.  Contributions, Lobbying, and Committee Voting in the U.S. House of Representatives , 1990, American Political Science Review.

[37]  Steven S. Smith,et al.  Managing Uncertainty in the House of Representatives: Adaptation and Innovation in Special Rules , 1988 .

[38]  Michael C. Munger,et al.  The impact of legislator attributes on interest-group campaign contributions , 1986 .