Targeting Managerial Control: Evidence from Franchising
暂无分享,去创建一个
[1] Robert E. Martin. Franchising and Risk Management , 1988 .
[2] E. Lazear,et al. Personnel Economics: Past Lessons and Future Directions Presidential Address to the Society of Labor Economists, San Francisco, May 1, 1998 , 1999, Journal of Labor Economics.
[3] F. Scott. Franchising vs. company ownership as a decision variable of the firm , 1995 .
[4] N. Lutz,et al. Ownership Rights and Incentives in Franchising , 1995 .
[5] R. Blair,et al. A note on incentive incompatibility under franchising , 1994 .
[6] James A. Brickley,et al. An Agency Perspective on Franchising , 1991 .
[7] M. Kehoe. Franchising, agency problems, and the cost of capital , 1996 .
[8] Rajiv P. Dant,et al. Ownership Redirection in Franchised Channels , 1992 .
[9] B. Lyons,et al. Empirical relevance of efficient contract theory: inter-firm contracts , 1996 .
[10] Paul H. Rubin. The Theory of the Firm and the Structure of the Franchise Contract , 1978, Journal law and economy.
[11] Michael Waldman,et al. Careers in organizations: Theory and evidence , 1999 .
[12] Francine Lafontaine. Agency Theory and Franchising: Some Empirical Results , 1992 .
[13] H. Carmichael,et al. The Agent-Agents Problem: Payment by Relative Output , 1983, Journal of Labor Economics.
[14] Alanson P. Minkler. An empirical analysis of a firm's decision to franchise , 1990 .
[15] Patrick J. Kaufmann,et al. The Evolution of Ownersip Patterns in Franchise Systems , 1994 .
[16] A. Dnes. Franchising: A Case-Study Approach , 1992 .
[17] Andrea Shepard. Contractual form, retail price, and asset characteristics , 1991 .
[18] A. Dnes. 'Unfair' Contractual Practices and Hostages in Franchise Contracts , 1992 .
[19] M. Slade,et al. Retail contracting and costly monitoring: Theory and evidence , 1996 .
[20] Paul R. Milgrom,et al. Multitask Principal–Agent Analyses: Incentive Contracts, Asset Ownership, and Job Design , 1991 .
[21] B. Elango,et al. Franchising Research: A Literature Review and Synthesis , 1997 .
[22] P. T. Spiller,et al. Strategyand Transaction Costs: The Organizationofdistributioninthecarbonatedsoftdrinkindustry , 1992 .
[23] R. Gibbons. Incentives in Organizations , 1998 .
[24] A. W. Dnes. A Case-Study Analysis of Franchise Contracts , 1993, The Journal of Legal Studies.
[25] M. Slade,et al. Retail Contracting: Theory and Practice , 2003 .
[26] K. Shaw,et al. The Dynamics of Franchise Contracting: Evidence from Panel Data , 1996, Journal of Political Economy.
[27] Francine Lafontaine,et al. The role of risk in franchising , 1995 .
[28] Frank A. ScottJr.. Franchising vs. company ownership as a decision variable of the firm , 1995 .
[29] Nancy Gallini,et al. Dual Distribution and Royalty Fees in Franchising , 1992 .
[30] D. Norén. The Economics of the Golden Arches: A Case Study of the Mcdonald's System , 1990 .
[31] Seth W. Norton,et al. An Empirical Look at Franchising as an Organizational Form , 1988 .
[32] C. L. Narayana,et al. Competitive Advantage Variation Over The Life Cycle of a Franchise , 1976 .
[33] Richard Thompson. The franchise life cycle and the Penrose effect , 1994 .
[34] Margaret E. Slade,et al. Incentive Contracting and the Franchise Decision , 1998 .
[35] B. Klein. The Economics of Franchise Contracts , 1995 .
[36] Canice Prendergast. The Provision of Incentives in Firms , 1999 .
[37] K. Shaw,et al. Franchising growth and franchisor entry and exit in the U.S. market: Myth and reality , 1998 .
[38] Julie Wulf. Internal Capital Markets and Firm‐Level Compensation Incentives for Division Managers , 2002, Journal of Labor Economics.
[39] R. Caves,et al. Franchising: Firms, Markets, and Intangible Assets , 1976 .
[40] Torsten Schmidt. An analysis of intrabrand competition in the franchise industry , 1994 .
[41] Patrick J. Kaufmann,et al. Costs of Control: The Source of Economic Rents for McDonald's Franchisees , 1994, The Journal of Law and Economics.
[42] E. Anderson. The growth and performance of franchise systems: Company versus franchisee ownership , 1984 .
[43] R. Maness. Incomplete contracts and the choice between vertical integration and franchising , 1996 .
[44] Francine Lafontaine,et al. Double-Sided Moral Hazard and the Nature of Share Contracts , 1995 .
[45] Stan Luxenberg,et al. Roadside empires : how the chains franchised America , 1986 .
[46] James A. Brickley,et al. The Economic Effects of Franchise Termination Laws , 1991, The Journal of Law and Economics.
[47] R. Lal. Improving Channel Coordination Through Franchising , 1990 .
[48] E. Lazear. Personnel Economics: Past Lessons and Future Directions , 1999 .
[49] Eric Gedajlovic,et al. Vertical integration in Franchise systems: Agency theory and resource explanations , 1991 .
[50] James A. Brickley. Incentive Conflicts and Contracting: Evidence from Franchising , 1995 .
[51] James A. Brickley,et al. The choice of organizational form The case of franchising , 1987 .
[52] Jeffrey L. Bradach. Using the Plural Form in the Management of Restaurant Chains , 1997 .
[53] John F. Love,et al. McDonald's: Behind The Arches , 1986 .