Mixed refinements of Shapley's saddles and weak tournaments

Abstract. We investigate refinements of two solutions, the saddle and the weak saddle, defined by Shapley (1964) for two-player zero-sum games. Applied to weak tournaments, the first refinement, the mixed saddle, is unique and gives us a new solution, generally lying between the GETCHA and GOTCHA sets of Schwartz (1972, 1986). In the absence of ties, all three solutions reduce to the usual top cycle set. The second refinement, the weak mixed saddle, is not generally unique, but, in the absence of ties, it is unique and coincides with the minimal covering set.

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