An ADMM-Based Method for Computing Risk-Averse Equilibrium in Capacity Markets

Uncertainty in electricity markets introduces risk for investors. High fixed cost and increased dependency on infrequent and uncertain price spikes characterize investments. The risk-averse behavior of investors might lead to poor decision-making and undermines generation adequacy. Electricity market models rarely treat the interaction of market design and risk aversion. The representation of capacity mechanisms in modeling approaches focusing on risk aversion is limited. Our contribution addresses two problems. First, we propose a stochastic market equilibrium model. Investors are represented as risk-averse agents. The conditional value-at-risk is used as risk measure. Second, we propose an algorithm based on the alternating direction method of multipliers to compute a risk-averse equilibrium. We benchmark our approach with a state-of-the-art solver relying on a mixed complementarity problem reformulation. We show that for larger case studies our proposed approach is preferable. The algorithm converges in all cases while conventional solvers fail to compute a risk-averse equilibrium. The methodology is transferable to other risk-averse equilibrium models. With reference to capacity markets, we conclude that they are more beneficial in a risk-averse market. Capacity markets result in lower total cost, while avoiding expected energy not served. This statement still holds with increased price caps in energy-only markets.

[1]  Yves Smeers,et al.  Generation Capacity Expansion in a Risky Environment: A Stochastic Equilibrium Analysis , 2011, Oper. Res..

[2]  O. Ozdemir,et al.  Simulation modeling and optimization of competitive electricity markets and stochastic fluid systems , 2013 .

[3]  Yves Smeers,et al.  Risk Trading and Endogenous Probabilities in Investment Equilibria , 2015, SIAM J. Optim..

[4]  K. Arrow,et al.  EXISTENCE OF AN EQUILIBRIUM FOR A COMPETITIVE ECONOMY , 1954 .

[5]  John R. Birge,et al.  A stochastic model for the unit commitment problem , 1996 .

[6]  B. Hobbs,et al.  Optimal Generation Mix With Short-Term Demand Response and Wind Penetration , 2012, IEEE Transactions on Power Systems.

[7]  Anthony Papavasiliou,et al.  Wind farm portfolio optimization under network capacity constraints , 2015, Eur. J. Oper. Res..

[8]  P. Harker Generalized Nash games and quasi-variational inequalities , 1991 .

[9]  R. Rockafellar,et al.  Optimization of conditional value-at risk , 2000 .

[10]  Y. Smeers,et al.  Complementarity Problems in Restructured Natural Gas Markets , 2005 .

[11]  Gerard Doorman,et al.  Capacity mechanisms: needs, solutions and state of affairs , 2016 .

[12]  Sergey Sarykalin,et al.  Value-at-Risk vs. Conditional Value-at-Risk in Risk Management and Optimization , 2008 .

[13]  Ronnie Belmans,et al.  Capacity remuneration mechanisms and the transition to low-carbon power systems , 2015, 2015 12th International Conference on the European Energy Market (EEM).

[14]  Andrew B. Philpott,et al.  On risk averse competitive equilibrium , 2018, Oper. Res. Lett..

[15]  Alexander Shapiro,et al.  Lectures on Stochastic Programming: Modeling and Theory , 2009 .

[16]  Stephen P. Boyd,et al.  Distributed Optimization and Statistical Learning via the Alternating Direction Method of Multipliers , 2011, Found. Trends Mach. Learn..

[17]  Axel Ockenfels,et al.  Capacity Market Fundamentals , 2013 .

[18]  European security of electricity supply policy in the context of increasing volumes of intermittent generation , 2012 .

[19]  Xiaoming Yuan,et al.  On the convergence of the direct extension of ADMM for three-block separable convex minimization models with one strongly convex function , 2017, Comput. Optim. Appl..

[20]  Yves Smeers,et al.  Investment with incomplete markets for risk: The need for long-term contracts☆ , 2017 .

[21]  Erik Delarue,et al.  Selecting Representative Days for Capturing the Implications of Integrating Intermittent Renewables in Generation Expansion Planning Problems , 2017, IEEE Transactions on Power Systems.

[22]  D. Newbery Missing Money and Missing Markets: Reliability, Capacity Auctions and Interconnectors , 2015 .

[23]  B. Hobbs,et al.  Complementarity Modeling in Energy Markets , 2012 .

[24]  R. Belmans,et al.  Electricity markets for energy, flexibility and availability — Impact of capacity mechanisms on the remuneration of generation technologies , 2017 .

[25]  Sabine Fuss,et al.  Investment risks in power generation: A comparison of fossil fuel and renewable energy dominated markets , 2016 .

[26]  Roger B. Myerson,et al.  Game theory - Analysis of Conflict , 1991 .

[27]  Stephen P. Boyd,et al.  Dynamic Network Energy Management via Proximal Message Passing , 2013, Found. Trends Optim..

[28]  Zhi-Quan Luo,et al.  On the linear convergence of the alternating direction method of multipliers , 2012, Mathematical Programming.

[29]  Ronnie Belmans,et al.  Influence of non-harmonized capacity mechanisms in an interconnected power system on generation adequacy , 2016, 2016 Power Systems Computation Conference (PSCC).

[30]  S. Dirkse,et al.  The path solver: a nommonotone stabilization scheme for mixed complementarity problems , 1995 .

[31]  Ariel Rubinstein,et al.  A Course in Game Theory , 1995 .

[32]  Yves Smeers,et al.  Liquidity risks on power exchanges: a generalized Nash equilibrium model , 2013, Math. Program..

[33]  Claudia A. Sagastizábal,et al.  An approximation scheme for a class of risk-averse stochastic equilibrium problems , 2016, Math. Program..