Mass Atrocity Response Operations: A Military Planning Handbook

Abstract : A Mass Atrocity Response Operation (MARO) describes a contingency operation to halt the widespread and systematic use of violence by state or non-state armed groups against non-combatants. The term MARO is not yet enshrined in military doctrine--but it should be. The United States does not currently recognize mass atrocities as a unique operational challenge, and there is no operational concept or doctrine that might help commanders understand the dynamics and demands of responding to mass atrocities. As a result, the US is not fully prepared to intervene effectively in a mass atrocity situation. This Military Planning Handbook is guided by the core belief that the nature of mass atrocity, and the focus of a mission to stop it, means that a MARO presents unique operational challenges requiring careful preparation and planning. This Handbook aims to create a shared understanding of the specific and even unique aspects of mass atrocities and a common military approach to addressing them. Part I of the Handbook explains how a MARO is a specific type of operation involving a dynamic mix of offense, defense, and stability operations. Many of the tasks and qualities of a MARO can resemble those found in other kinds of operations; however, the fact that the tasks and concepts are familiar reveals little about the dramatically different context in which those tasks must be performed. The Handbook details the three main distinctions of a MARO context: (1) Multiparty Dynamics; (2) Illusion of Impartiality; and (3) Escalatory Dynamics.

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