FairTorrent: bringing fairness to peer-to-peer systems

Peer-to-Peer file-sharing applications suffer from a fundamental problem of unfairness. Free-riders cause slower download times for others by contributing little or no upload bandwidth while consuming much download bandwidth. Previous attempts to address this fair bandwidth allocation problem suffer from slow peer discovery, inaccurate predictions of neighboring peers' bandwidth allocations, underutilization of bandwidth, and complex parameter tuning. We present FairTorrent, a new deficit-based distributed algorithm that accurately rewards peers in accordance with their contribution. A FairTorrent peer simply uploads the next data block to a peer to whom it owes the most data as measured by a deficit counter. FairTorrent is resilient to exploitation by free-riders and strategic peers, is simple to implement, requires no bandwidth over-allocation, no prediction of peers' rates, no centralized control, and no parameter tuning. We implemented FairTorrent in a BitTorrent client without modifications to the BitTorrent protocol, and evaluated its performance against other widely-used BitTorrent clients. Our results show that FairTorrent provides up to two orders of magnitude better fairness, up to five times better download times for contributing peers, and 60% to 100% better performance on average in live BitTorrent swarms.

[1]  Eddie Kohler,et al.  Clustering and sharing incentives in BitTorrent systems , 2006, SIGMETRICS '07.

[2]  Bin Fan,et al.  The Delicate Tradeoffs in BitTorrent-like File Sharing Protocol Design , 2006, Proceedings of the 2006 IEEE International Conference on Network Protocols.

[3]  Thomas E. Anderson,et al.  One Hop Reputations for Peer to Peer File Sharing Workloads , 2008, NSDI.

[4]  Venkata N. Padmanabhan,et al.  Analyzing and Improving a BitTorrent Networks Performance Mechanisms , 2006, Proceedings IEEE INFOCOM 2006. 25TH IEEE International Conference on Computer Communications.

[5]  Vishal Misra,et al.  Improving BitTorrent: a simple approach , 2008, IPTPS.

[6]  Bobby Bhattacharjee,et al.  Bittorrent is an auction: analyzing and improving bittorrent's incentives , 2008, SIGCOMM '08.

[7]  Hector Garcia-Molina,et al.  The Eigentrust algorithm for reputation management in P2P networks , 2003, WWW '03.

[8]  Abhay Parekh,et al.  A generalized processor sharing approach to flow control in integrated services networks: the single-node case , 1993, TNET.

[9]  Leonard Kleinrock,et al.  On Fairness, Optimal Download Performance and Proportional Replication in Peer-to-Peer Networks , 2005, NETWORKING.

[10]  George Varghese,et al.  Efficient fair queueing using deficit round robin , 1995, SIGCOMM '95.

[11]  Michael Sirivianos,et al.  Dandelion: Cooperative Content Distribution with Robust Incentives , 2007, USENIX Annual Technical Conference.

[12]  Hui Zhang,et al.  WF/sup 2/Q: worst-case fair weighted fair queueing , 1996, Proceedings of IEEE INFOCOM '96. Conference on Computer Communications.

[13]  Michael Dahlin,et al.  BAR gossip , 2006, OSDI '06.

[14]  R. Shreedhar,et al.  Efficient Fair Queuing Using Deficit Round - , 1997 .

[15]  Karthik Tamilmani,et al.  SWIFT: A System With Incentives For Trading , 2004 .

[16]  Abhay Parekh,et al.  A generalized processor sharing approach to flow control in integrated services networks-the single node case , 1992, [Proceedings] IEEE INFOCOM '92: The Conference on Computer Communications.

[17]  Stefan Schmid,et al.  Free Riding in BitTorrent is Cheap , 2006, HotNets.

[18]  Mustaque Ahamad,et al.  Incentives in BitTorrent induce free riding , 2005, P2PECON '05.

[19]  Christos H. Papadimitriou,et al.  Free-riding and whitewashing in peer-to-peer systems , 2004, IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications.

[20]  Bo Li,et al.  DONet: A Data-Driven Overlay Network For Efficient Live Media Streaming , 2004, INFOCOM 2005.

[21]  Fang Wu,et al.  Proportional response dynamics leads to market equilibrium , 2007, STOC '07.

[22]  S. Jamaloddin Golestani,et al.  A self-clocked fair queueing scheme for broadband applications , 1994, Proceedings of INFOCOM '94 Conference on Computer Communications.

[23]  Michael Sirivianos,et al.  Free-riding in BitTorrent Networks with the Large View Exploit , 2007, IPTPS.

[24]  Dan S. Wallach,et al.  Enforcing Fair Sharing of Peer-to-Peer Resources , 2003, IPTPS.

[25]  Michael Dahlin,et al.  BAR fault tolerance for cooperative services , 2005, SOSP '05.

[26]  Karl Aberer,et al.  Managing trust in a peer-2-peer information system , 2001, CIKM '01.

[27]  Scott Shenker,et al.  Analysis and simulation of a fair queueing algorithm , 1989, SIGCOMM '89.

[28]  Rayadurgam Srikant,et al.  Modeling and performance analysis of BitTorrent-like peer-to-peer networks , 2004, SIGCOMM 2004.

[29]  Emin Gün Sirer,et al.  KARMA : A Secure Economic Framework for Peer-to-Peer Resource Sharing , 2003 .

[30]  Gul A. Agha,et al.  ARA: a robust audit to prevent free-riding in P2P networks , 2005, Fifth IEEE International Conference on Peer-to-Peer Computing (P2P'05).

[31]  Arun Venkataramani,et al.  Building BitTyrant, a (More) Strategic BitTorrent Client , 2007, login Usenix Mag..

[32]  B. Cohen,et al.  Incentives Build Robustness in Bit-Torrent , 2003 .

[33]  Jeffrey C. Mogul,et al.  Proceedings of the 7th symposium on Operating systems design and implementation , 2006 .

[34]  Ernesto Damiani,et al.  Choosing reputable servents in a P2P network , 2002, WWW.

[35]  Michael Dahlin,et al.  FlightPath: Obedience vs. Choice in Cooperative Services , 2008, OSDI.

[36]  Paul Resnick,et al.  Reputation systems , 2000, CACM.

[37]  Yu Peng,et al.  Robust incentives via multi‐level Tit‐for‐Tat , 2008, IPTPS.

[38]  Animesh Nandi,et al.  Fair Bandwidth and Storage Sharing in Peer-to-Peer Networks , 2003 .

[39]  Arun Venkataramani,et al.  Do incentives build robustness in bit torrent , 2007 .