Analysis of an internet voting protocol

The Norwegian government is planning trials of internet voting in the 2011 local government elections. We describe and analyse the cryptographic protocol that will be used. In our opinion, the protocol is suitable for trials of internet voting, even though it is not perfect. This paper is a second step in an ongoing evaluation of the cryptographic protocol.

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