Theory of the Firm: Past, Present, and Future; An Interpretation

Hence, even if the "partial equilibrium analyst" knows full well that the actual situation is not really a competitive one, he probably will still make a first try using the competitive model with good old-fashioned profit maximization. And if the results appear too odd, appropriate qualifications may still be able to take care of them more simply than if he had started with a cumbersome managerial model. (In saying this, I am showing my bias.) [18, p. 30]

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