The politicization of UNESCO World Heritage decision making

The purpose of the UNESCO World Heritage Convention is to protect the global merit good of cultural and natural heritage of outstanding universal value for humanity. Many observers, however, have suggested that this international organization is subject to politicization as the selection process of sites on the World Heritage List is increasingly driven by countries’ political influence and national strategic interests. This article explores this possibility quantitatively by analyzing a unique dataset containing information from the summary records of the UNESCO World Heritage Committee’s sessions over the 2003–2012 period. Focusing on the difference between technical experts’ recommendations and Committee final decisions on new additions to the List, our empirical analysis addresses four main theoretical questions: (i) Does the World Heritage Committee follow the advisory bodies’ recommendations for the evaluation of heritage sites? (ii) Does Committee membership or size of national delegations influence the addition of sites to the List or an upgrade of the initial technical evaluations? (iii) Is the Committee’s decision regarding the selection of World Heritage sites driven by a country’s political and economic power? (iv) Do close political and economic relationships between countries influence Committee members’ behavior? The paper contributes to Public Choice literature on international organizations by providing new evidence on the role of political and economic interests in decision making concerning global merit goods.

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