论文信息 - Conciliatory Views of Disagreement and Higher-Order Evidence

Conciliatory Views of Disagreement and Higher-Order Evidence

ABSTRACT Conciliatory views of disagreement maintain that discovering a particular type of disagreement requires that one make doxastic conciliation. In this paper I give a more formal characterization of such a view. After explaining and motivating this view as the correct view regarding the epistemic significance of disagreement, I proceed to defend it from several objections concerning higher-order evidence (evidence about the character of one's evidence) made by Thomas Kelly (2005).

Jonathan Matheson | Jonathan D. Matheson

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