Science and the Philosophy of Science

HERE are some indications that the philosophy of science is reaching the age of discretion. Now, as I understand it, the age of discretion is characterized by self-examination. Youth is a period of blundering enthusiasm. But maturity demands the sobering influence of principles, perspectives and techniques. The adult must put away childish things. This does not demand the elimination of spontaneity and imagination, but it does require their chastening according to the principles of propriety. It seems time to ask ourselves whether the philosophy of science ought to be allowed henceforth just to grow, like Topsy, or whether a serious attempt ought not to be made to determine its nature and task. As a step in the direction of defining more precisely the scope and method of the philosophy of science I should like to propose that the essence of this problem seems to lie in the nature of the relation which the philosophy of science bears to science. This appears to be an elementary problem. The philosophy of science is about science, and that seems to be the end of the matter. But the precise way in which the philosophy of science is about science is not at all clear. It is not at all evident that there is