The Economics of Roscas and Intra-Household Resource Allocation

This paper investigates individual motives to participate in rotating savings and credit associations (roscas). Detailed evidence from roscas in a Kenyan slum (Nairobi) suggests that most roscas are predominantly composed of women, particularly those living in a couple and earning an independent income. We propose an explanation of this based on conflictual interactions within the household. Participation in a rosea is a strategy a wife employs to protect her savings against claims by her husband for immediate consumption. The empirical implications of the model are then tested using the data collected in Kenya.

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