Optimal Information Retrieval under Asymmetric Information in Constrained Power Markets

The problem of asymmetric information in electricity market is due to uncertainty in determining individual cost functions in assessing the participants' bids. Individual loads or demand functions are assumed to be known to all participants. Based on the information asymmetry, it is proposed that individual generators may attempt to optimize their operating profits by making assumptions about the uncertain information. Each generator selects a supply bid curve as the best response to all simulated bidding scenarios. After observing the actual outcomes and performing sensitivity analysis from the most similar bidding scenario, the bids are adjusted for subsequent use. The optimality of the decisions may need to be altered by the power system constraints. The objective of the paper is to provide a possible way of extracting information from the bidding process rather than analyzing the strategic behavior of the generators.

[1]  Benjamin Kaplan,et al.  The movement for international copyright in nineteenth century America , 1962, American Journal of International Law.

[2]  Allen J. Wood,et al.  Power Generation, Operation, and Control , 1984 .

[3]  J. J. Ancona,et al.  A bid solicitation and selection method for developing a competitive spot priced electric market , 1997 .

[4]  A. David,et al.  Optimal bidding strategies and modeling of imperfect information among competitive generators , 2001 .

[5]  I. Pool Communications Flows: A Census in the United States and Japan , 1984 .

[6]  Pamela Samuelson,et al.  A Manifesto Concerning the Legal Protection of Computer Programs: Why Existing Laws Fail To Provide Adequate Protection , 1994, KnowRight.

[7]  D. Newbery,et al.  Preemptive Patenting and the Persistence of Monopoly , 1982 .

[8]  Aaas News,et al.  Book Reviews , 1893, Buffalo Medical and Surgical Journal.

[9]  R. Coase,et al.  The Firm, the Market, and the Law , 1990 .

[10]  D. J. Wu,et al.  Optimal bidding and contracting strategies in the deregulated electric power market: part II , 2000, Proceedings of the 34th Annual Hawaii International Conference on System Sciences.

[11]  Hal R. Varian,et al.  Information rules - a strategic guide to the network economy , 1999 .

[12]  H. Carmichael Incentives in Academics: Why is There Tenure? , 1988, Journal of Political Economy.

[13]  M. L. Baughman,et al.  An Empirical Study of Applied Game Theory: Transmission Constrained Cournot Behavior , 2002, IEEE Power Engineering Review.

[14]  Frank A. Wolak,et al.  Diagnosing Market Power in California's Restructured Wholesale Electricity Market , 2000 .