论文信息 - Energy efficiency via incentive design and utility learning

Energy efficiency via incentive design and utility learning

Utility companies have many motivations for modifying energy consumption patterns of consumers such as revenue decoupling and demand response programs. We model the utility company-consumer interaction as a principal-agent problem and present an iterative algorithm for designing incentives while estimating the consumer's utility function.

Henrik Ohlsson | S. Shankar Sastry | Lillian J. Ratliff | Roy Dong

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