Political Regimes and Economic Growth

Arguments that relate regimes to growth focus on property rights, pressures for immediate consumption, and the autonomy of dictators. While everyone seems to agree that secure property rights foster growth, it is controversial whether democracies or dictatorships better secure these rights. The main mechanism by which democracy is thought to hinder growth is pressure for immediate consumption, which reduces investment. Only states that are institutionally insulated from such pressures can resist them, and democratic states are not. The main argument against dictatorships is that authoritarian rulers have no interest in maximizing total output. These views are summarized in turn.

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