Safety Analysis for Highly Automated Driving

Highly automated driving affords a fail-operational system and therefore more effort regarding functional safety. The engineering standard for vehicles, ISO 26262 does not give an applicable approach for a safety argumentation in this context and has its limitations regarding fail-operational systems. Therefore, the aim of the work is to enhance methods in compliance with ISO 26262. For this purpose, methods for the safety analysis are evaluated and extended for the usage in fail-operational systems. This concerns especially the dependent failure analysis, where completeness and applicable guidelines in the automotive domain will be derived. I will also address quantification of common-cause events and derive factors. Furthermore the extension of deductive and inductive methods will be discussed and state-machines and control structures will be verified.

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