Informational smallness in rational expectations equilibria

In an economy with asymmetric information, Rational Expectations Equilibria (REE) need not become asymptotically incentive compatible, even if many independent replicas of the economy are merged together. We identify a sub-class of REE for which this is nevertheless the case.

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