A Measure of Added Value in Groups

The intuitive notion of added value in groups represents a fundamental property of biological, physical, and economic systems: how the interaction or cooperation of multiple entities, substances, or other agents can produce synergistic effects. However, despite the ubiquity of group formation, a well-founded measure of added value has remained elusive. Here, we propose such a measure inspired by the Shapley value—a fundamental solution concept from Cooperative Game Theory. To this end, we start by developing a solution concept that measures the average impact of each player in a coalitional game and show how this measure uniquely satisfies a set of intuitive properties. Then, building upon our solution concept, we propose a measure of added value that not only analyzes the interactions of players inside their group, but also outside it, thereby reflecting otherwise-hidden information about how these individuals typically perform in various groups of the population.

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