An Inertia-Based Data Recovery Scheme for False Data Injection Attack

Due to vulnerabilities exposed to cyberattacks in the cyber physical power system, increasing concerns have been paid to its cybersecurity, especially on the so-called false data injection attack. Timely recovering true values of measurements and states after encountering cyber-attacks is of paramount importance for ensuring the subsequent controls and operations of the cyber physical power system. This article, for the first time, discovers a measurement data inertia effect, and uses this effect to deduce coarse values of preattack measurements as a preliminary work for data recovery. Then, based on the deduced coarse values and suggested state bounds, an optimization model is proposed to recover the measurements and states contaminated by attacks in-time. Moreover, an error criterion named interval error is proposed to assess the entire performance of the proposed recovery scheme. Extensive and comprehensive experiments are implemented on the IEEE 30-bus test benchmark to verify the feasibility and effectiveness of the proposed recovery scheme. The numerical studies reveal that the proposed method can achieve high accuracy and efficient timeliness for data recovery.

[1]  Huaizhi Wang,et al.  Operating State Reconstruction in Cyber Physical Smart Grid for Automatic Attack Filtering , 2022, IEEE Transactions on Industrial Informatics.

[2]  Hossein Seifi,et al.  An Optimization-Based Approach to Recover the Detected Attacked Grid Variables After False Data Injection Attack , 2021, IEEE Transactions on Smart Grid.

[3]  Huaizhi Wang,et al.  Extreme Learning Machine-Based State Reconstruction for Automatic Attack Filtering in Cyber Physical Power System , 2021, IEEE Transactions on Industrial Informatics.

[4]  Yuanyuan Wang,et al.  Online Generative Adversary Network Based Measurement Recovery in False Data Injection Attacks: A Cyber-Physical Approach , 2020, IEEE Transactions on Industrial Informatics.

[5]  Zuyi Li,et al.  False Data Injection Attacks Induced Sequential Outages in Power Systems , 2019, IEEE Transactions on Power Systems.

[6]  Zhao Yang Dong,et al.  A Framework for Cyber-Topology Attacks: Line-Switching and New Attack Scenarios , 2019, IEEE Transactions on Smart Grid.

[7]  Canbing Li,et al.  Dynamic Data Injection Attack Detection of Cyber Physical Power Systems With Uncertainties , 2019, IEEE Transactions on Industrial Informatics.

[8]  Zhiwei Wang,et al.  Online Identification and Data Recovery for PMU Data Manipulation Attack , 2019, IEEE Transactions on Smart Grid.

[9]  Aditya Ashok,et al.  Online Detection of Stealthy False Data Injection Attacks in Power System State Estimation , 2018, IEEE Transactions on Smart Grid.

[10]  Yitao Liu,et al.  Deep Learning-Based Interval State Estimation of AC Smart Grids Against Sparse Cyber Attacks , 2018, IEEE Transactions on Industrial Informatics.

[11]  Lamine Mili,et al.  A Generalized False Data Injection Attacks Against Power System Nonlinear State Estimator and Countermeasures , 2018, IEEE Transactions on Power Systems.

[12]  Zhao Yang Dong,et al.  The 2015 Ukraine Blackout: Implications for False Data Injection Attacks , 2017, IEEE Transactions on Power Systems.

[13]  L. Mili,et al.  A Robust Iterated Extended Kalman Filter for Power System Dynamic State Estimation , 2017, IEEE Transactions on Power Systems.

[14]  Zhao Yang Dong,et al.  A Review of False Data Injection Attacks Against Modern Power Systems , 2017, IEEE Transactions on Smart Grid.

[15]  Zhigang Chu,et al.  Can Attackers With Limited Information Exploit Historical Data to Mount Successful False Data Injection Attacks on Power Systems? , 2017, IEEE Transactions on Power Systems.

[16]  Ali Davoudi,et al.  Detection of False-Data Injection Attacks in Cyber-Physical DC Microgrids , 2017, IEEE Transactions on Industrial Informatics.

[17]  Mehul Motani,et al.  Detecting False Data Injection Attacks in AC State Estimation , 2015, IEEE Transactions on Smart Grid.

[18]  Puqiang Zhang,et al.  Data-driven method based on particle swarm optimization and k-nearest neighbor regression for estimating capacity of lithium-ion battery , 2014 .

[19]  Gabriela Hug,et al.  Vulnerability Assessment of AC State Estimation With Respect to False Data Injection Cyber-Attacks , 2012, IEEE Transactions on Smart Grid.

[20]  Alessandro Barenghi,et al.  Fault Injection Attacks on Cryptographic Devices: Theory, Practice, and Countermeasures , 2012, Proceedings of the IEEE.

[21]  Zuyi Li,et al.  Modeling Load Redistribution Attacks in Power Systems , 2011, IEEE Transactions on Smart Grid.

[22]  H. Vincent Poor,et al.  Strategic Protection Against Data Injection Attacks on Power Grids , 2011, IEEE Transactions on Smart Grid.

[23]  W. L. Kling,et al.  Wavelet Decomposition for Power Balancing Analysis , 2011, IEEE Transactions on Power Delivery.

[24]  Peng Ning,et al.  False data injection attacks against state estimation in electric power grids , 2009, CCS.

[25]  B. De Moor,et al.  Short-term load forecasting, profile identification, and customer segmentation: a methodology based on periodic time series , 2005, IEEE Transactions on Power Systems.

[26]  A. G. Expósito,et al.  Power system state estimation : theory and implementation , 2004 .

[27]  Song Tan,et al.  Online Data Integrity Attacks Against Real-Time Electrical Market in Smart Grid , 2018, IEEE Transactions on Smart Grid.