论文信息 - Prior Inferences for Posterior Judgements

Prior Inferences for Posterior Judgements

We consider the minimal assumptions of temporal consistency that will allow us to make meaningful prior statements about our posterior judgements. These consistency conditions suggest a natural geometric interpretation of ‘prior inference’ which we develop and interpret. We discuss various applications of the geometric construction.

Michael Goldstein | M. Goldstein

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