Capability Modeling of Information Deceiving and Achieving in Message Tampering Confrontations

In confronting communication environments, the attackers can tamper with messages and consequently deceive the receivers as long as the malicious actions are not recognized. Although numerous works have been done to alleviate the damage of such threat, no special model has been formed to demonstrate the accurate capability bounds of the attackers and defenders in such confrontations so far. Inspired by this problem as well as the Shannon channel capacity model, this paper converts the confronting capability problems into channel capacity issues, and forms the capability models for both the attackers in information deceiving and the receivers in information achieving. The models, which are rigorously proved, reveal the capability upper bounds of the attackers and the receivers in message tampering confrontations, no matter any specific measures the confronting peers taking. Extensive simulations are implemented and the results verify the effectiveness of the proposed models, which simultaneously indicate the optimal strategies of both the attackers and the receivers.