论文信息 - Voting over income tax schedules

Voting over income tax schedules

Abstract In many voting situations, preferences over options may fail to be single-peaked. This is especially true when options consist of different amounts of a good which is provided through distortionary taxation. In this paper, voting over linear income tax schedules is considered. Although preferences may fail to be single-peaked, a choice set is shown to exist when only mild restrictions are imposed. For many choices in the public domain, the conditions required for this result are likely to be satisfied.

Kevin Roberts | K. Roberts

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