Estimating the option value of a non-firm electricity tariff

We estimate the option value of a non-firm electricity tariff commonly used by a local distribution company (LDC) in its electricity demand response program. This option value captures the benefit that a LDC enjoys from not serving an end-use load during high-price hours in a wholesale electricity market. It is conservative in that it does not include the cost savings in meeting the LDC's resource adequacy requirement or deferring transmission and distribution (TD and (b) a simulation exercise to quantify the tariff's value under a specific design. The results indicate that a non-firm service tariff can have varying option value estimates that are highly sensitive to the tariff's design, and that an incentive payment based on the option value alone is likely insufficient to attract customer participation in a non-firm service program.

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