Formal Vulnerability Analysis of a Security System for Remote Fieldbus Access

As fieldbus networks are becoming accessible from the Internet, security mechanisms to grant access only to authorized users and to protect data are becoming essential. This paper proposes a formally based approach to the analysis of such systems, both at the security protocols level and at the system architecture level. This multilevel analysis allows the evaluation of the effects of an attack on the overall system, due to security problems that affect the underlying security protocols. A case study on a typical fieldbus security system validates the approach.

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