Executive Stock Option Plans and Corporate Dividend Policy

This paper examines the association between the initial adoption of stock options for senior-level executives and subsequent changes in corporate dividend policy. The primary research hypothesis is that the addition of a stock option to a manager's compensation package provides an incentive for the executive to reduce corporate dividends. This hypothesis follows from the observation that executive stock options are generally not “dividend protected.” The results suggest that dividends are reduced relative to expected dividends. We interpret these results as suggesting that the personal incentives of executives can affect certain aspects of the observed corporate dividend policy.

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