False-Name-Proof Facility Location on Discrete Structures

We consider the problem of locating a single facility on a vertex in a given graph based on agents' preferences, where the domain of the preferences is either single-peaked or single-dipped. Our main interest is the existence of deterministic social choice functions (SCFs) that are Pareto efficient and false-name-proof, i.e., resistant to fake votes. We show that regardless of whether preferences are single-peaked or single-dipped, such an SCF exists (i) for any tree graph, and (ii) for a cycle graph if and only if its length is less than six. We also show that when the preferences are single-peaked, such an SCF exists for any ladder (i.e., 2-by-m grid) graph, and does not exist for any larger hypergrid.

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