Full revelation of information in Sender-Receiver games of persuasion

We provide necessary and sufficient conditions on both players' preferences and information that can be certified for a Sender–Receiver game to possess a separating equilibrium, as well as sufficient conditions for every equilibrium of such a game to be separating. Accordingly, we generalize Seidmann and Winter's [D.J. Seidmann, E. Winter, Strategic information transmission with verifiable messages, Econometrica 65 (1997) 163–170] results to games with partial provability.

[1]  Asher Wolinsky.  Information transmission when the sender's preferences are uncertain , 2003, Games Econ. Behav..

[2]  Francesco Giovannoni,et al.  Secrecy, two-sided bias and the value of evidence , 2007, Games Econ. Behav..

[3]  Lily H. Fang,et al.  Investment Bank Reputation and the Price and Quality of Underwriting Services , 2005 .

[4]  Joel Watson,et al.  Evidence Disclosure and Verifiability , 2001 .

[5]  Frédéric Koessler,et al.  Persuasion games with higher-order uncertainty , 2003, J. Econ. Theory.

[6]  H. Shin.  News Management and the Value of Firms , 1994 .

[7]  H. Shin.  The Burden of Proof in a Game of Persuasion , 1994 .

[8]  Barton L. Lipman,et al.  Current Draft , 1994 .

[9]  Jérôme Mathis,et al.  Consulting an Expert with Potentially Conflicting Preferences , 2008 .

[10]  K. Hagerty,et al.  The Optimal Amount of Discretion to Allow in Disclosure , 1990 .

[11]  F. Forges,et al.  Equilibria with Communication in a Job Market Example , 1990 .

[12]  Daniel J. Seidmann,et al.  Strategic Information Transmission with Verifiable Messages , 1997 .

[13]  Paul R. Milgrom,et al.  Good News and Bad News: Representation Theorems and Applications , 1981 .

[14]  Andrew Postlewaite,et al.  Quality Testing and Disclosure , 1985 .

[15]  T. Cason,et al.  Environmental Labeling and Incomplete Consumer Information in Laboratory Markets , 2002 .

[16]  Oliver Hart,et al.  Disclosure Laws and Takeover Bids , 1980 .

[17]  Claude d'Aspremont,et al.  Bargaining and Sharing Innovative Knowledge , 2000 .

[18]  Paul R. Milgrom,et al.  Relying on the Information of Interested Parties , 1985 .

[19]  Françoise Forges,et al.  The ex ante incentive compatible core in the absence of wealth effects , 2002 .

[20]  Sanford J. Grossman.  The Informational Role of Warranties and Private Disclosure about Product Quality , 1981, The Journal of Law and Economics.

[21]  Yeon-Koo Che,et al.  The Optimal Mechanism for Selling to a Budget-Constrained Buyer , 2000, J. Econ. Theory.

[22]  J. Sobel,et al.  STRATEGIC INFORMATION TRANSMISSION , 1982 .

[23]  Andrew Postlewaite,et al.  Strategic Information Revelation , 1990 .