Institutions and the Path to the Modern Economy: Lessons from Medieval Trade

Varieties in economics, politics and societies are widely considered to be resulted from the influence of different institutions. However, economists, political scientists, and sociologists do not come to agree about what institutions are, which forces contribute to the maintenance of institutions and their changes, and how it is possible to affect institutions development. The author proposes an understanding of institutions which integrates outwardly opposite perspectives of institutional approach in social sciences. His conception gives opportunities to deal with institutional roots, maintenance, endogenous changes and the influence of previous institutions on the successive ones. The journal «Economic Sociology» publishes the second chapter «Institutions and Ttransactions» in which the author defines the key concepts of his study in institutional backgrounds for markets and states.

[1]  E. Preston-whyte.  Culture in Action , 2008 .

[2]  Lauro Martines.  Violence and Civil Disorder in Italian Cities, 1200-1500 , 2008 .

[3]  A. Greif,et al.  Contract Enforcement and Institutions Among the Maghribi Traders: Refuting Edwards and Ogilvie , 2008 .

[4]  Susan Rose-Ackerman,et al.  Corruption and Government , 2008 .

[5]  H. Weisberg.  Political Science: The Science of Politics , 2008 .

[6]  Sheilagh Ogilvie,et al.  Contract Enforcement, Institutions and Social Capital: The Maghribi Traders Reappraised , 2008 .

[7]  S. Heydemann.  Institutions and Economic Performance: The Use and Abuse of Culture in New Institutional Economics , 2008 .

[8]  B. Berendsen.  Democracy and development , 2008 .

[9]  F. A. Hyett.  Florence: Her History and Art to the Fall of the Republic , 2007 .

[10]  P. Ingram,et al.  Organizational form as a solution to the problem of credible commitment: The evolution of naming strategies among U.S. hotel chains, 1896–1980 , 2007 .

[11]  G. Clark.  A Review of Avner Greif's Institutions and the Path to the Modern Economy: Lessons from Medieval Trade , 2007 .

[12]  Edgar Kiser.  Institutions and the Path to the Modern Economy: Lessons from Medieval Trade , 2007 .

[13]  N. Emrah Aydinonat.  Institutions: Theory, History and Context-Specific Analysis , 2006 .

[14]  G. Hamilton.  Civilizations and the organization of economies , 2006 .

[15]  Jeffrey Katz.  Lawlessness and Economics: Alternative Modes of Governance , 2006 .

[16]  R. Nelson.  Recent Evolutionary Theorizing about Economic Change , 2005, Technology, Institutions, and Economic Growth.

[17]  D. Bogart.  Turnpike trusts and the transportation revolution in 18th century England , 2005 .

[18]  Kai A. Konrad,et al.  The market for protection and the origin of the state , 2005, SSRN Electronic Journal.

[19]  Daniel Klerman.  The Value of Judicial Independence: Evidence from Eighteenth Century England , 2005 .

[20]  Arnaud Lechevalier,et al.  Why a Constitution , 2005 .

[21]  Gary A. Richardson.  Christianity and Craft Guilds in Late Medieval England: A Rational Choice Analysis , 2005 .

[22]  I. Shapiro,et al.  Problems and Methods in the Study of Politics , 2010 .

[23]  Kathleen A. Collins.  The Logic of Clan Politics: Evidence from the Central Asian Trajectories , 2004 .

[24]  A. Greif.  Impersonal Exchange without Impartial Law: The Community Responsibility System , 2004 .

[25]  Oliver Volckart.  The economics of feuding in late medieval Germany , 2004 .

[26]  A. Greif,et al.  A Theory of Endogenous Institutional Change , 2004, American Political Science Review.

[27]  Yishay Yafeh,et al.  Constitutions and Commitment: Evidence on the Relation between Institutions and the Cost of Capital , 2004 .

[28]  A. Ciccone,et al.  Resistance to Reform: Status Quo Bias in the Presence of Individual-Specific Uncertainty: Comment , 2004 .

[29]  D. Henley.  Conflict, Justice, and the Stranger-King Indigenous Roots of Colonial Rule in Indonesia and Elsewhere , 2004, Modern Asian Studies.

[30]  Robert J. Antony.  Contract and Property in Early Modern China , 2004 .

[31]  Daniel Klerman,et al.  The Value of Judicial Independence: Evidence from 18th Century England , 2004 .

[32]  Debin Ma.  Why Japan, Not China, Was the First to Develop in East Asia: Lessons from Sericulture, 1850–1937* , 2004, Economic Development and Cultural Change.

[33]  Ernst Fehr,et al.  Third Party Punishment and Social Norms , 2004 .

[34]  Marcel Fafchamps,et al.  Market Institutions in Sub-Saharan Africa: Theory and Evidence , 2004 .

[35]  A. Dixit.  Two-Tier Market Institutions , 2004 .

[36]  Ben Polak,et al.  The Emergence and Persistence of the Anglo-Saxon and German Financial Systems , 2004 .

[37]  P. Crone.  God's Rule : Government and Islam , 2004 .

[38]  Ron Harris,et al.  Government and the economy, 1688–1850 , 2004 .

[39]  Elhanan Helpman,et al.  The mystery of economic growth , 2004 .

[40]  O. Constable.  Housing the Stranger in the Mediterranean World: Lodging, Trade, and Travel in Late Antiquity and the Middle Ages , 2009 .

[41]  T. Kuran,et al.  Why the Middle East is Economically Underdeveloped: Historical Mechanisms of Institutional Stagnation , 2004 .

[42]  Daron Acemoglu,et al.  Why not a political Coase theorem? Social conflict, commitment, and politics , 2003 .

[43]  B. Yarbrough,et al.  The Contractual Role of Boundaries: Law and Economics Meets International Organization , 2003 .

[44]  C. Chamley.  Rational Herds: Economic Models of Social Learning , 2003 .

[45]  H. French,et al.  English Individualism Refuted - and Reasserted: The Land Market of Earls Colne (Essex), 1550-1750 , 2003 .

[46]  Jean-Philippe Platteau,et al.  The Risk of Resource Misappropriation in Community-Driven Development , 2003 .

[47]  Michael C. Herb.  Taxation and representation , 2003 .

[48]  Oded Galor,et al.  Das Human Kapital , 2003 .

[49]  Marshall W. Meyer,et al.  The New Economic Sociology: Developments in an Emerging Field , 2003 .

[50]  S. Haber,et al.  The Politics of Property Rights: Political Instability, Credible Commitments, and Economic Growth in Mexico, 1876-1929 , 2003 .

[51]  Jonathan Levin.  Relational Incentive Contracts , 2003 .

[52]  Kurt Annen,et al.  Social capital, inclusive networks, and economic performance , 2003 .

[53]  Daryl J. Levinson,et al.  Collective Sanctions , 2003 .

[54]  George J. Sheridan.  Priceless Markets: The Political Economy of Credit in Paris, 1660-1870 (review) , 2003, Journal of Interdisciplinary History.

[55]  C. Moriguchi.  Implicit Contracts, the Great Depression, and Institutional Change: A Comparative Analysis of U.S. and Japanese Employment Relations, 1920–1940 , 2003, The Journal of Economic History.

[56]  S. Haber,et al.  When the Law Does Not Matter: The Rise and Decline of the Mexican Oil Industry , 2003, The Journal of Economic History.

[57]  Andrey Korotayev.  Unilineal Descent Organization and Deep Christianization: A Cross-Cultural Comparison , 2003 .

[58]  Lars Peter Hansen,et al.  Advances in Economics and Econometrics: Theory and Applications, Eighth World Congress , 2003 .

[59]  Michihiro Kandori,et al.  The Erosion and Sustainability of Norms and Morale , 2003 .

[60]  Tyler Biggs,et al.  Ethnic networks and access to credit : evidence from the manufacturing sector in Kenya , 2002 .

[61]  D. Acemoglu.  Why Not a Political Coase Theorem? Social Conflict, Commitment and Politics , 2002 .

[62]  P. Wiessner.  Hunting, healing, and hxaro exchange A long-term perspective on !Kung (Ju/'hoansi) large-game hunting , 2002 .

[63]  K. Sokoloff,et al.  Factor Endowments, Inequality, and Paths of Development Among New World Economics , 2002 .

[64]  A. Greif,et al.  Organizing Violence , 2002 .

[65]  Andrei Shleifer,et al.  The New Comparative Economics , 2003 .

[66]  A. Greif.  Institutions and Impersonal Exchange: From Communal to Individual Responsibility , 2002 .

[67]  U. Schweizer.  Institutions and Impersonal Exchange: From Communal to Individual Responsibility , 2002 .

[68]  J. Sobel.  Can We Trust Social Capital , 2002 .

[69]  John H. Miller,et al.  NOTES AND COMMENTS GIVING ACCORDING TO GARP: AN EXPERIMENTAL TEST OF THE CONSISTENCY OF PREFERENCES FOR ALTRUISM , 2002 .

[70]  N. Campos,et al.  Who is Afraid of Political Instability , 2002 .

[71]  Alexander J. Field,et al.  Altruistically Inclined?: The Behavioral Sciences, Evolutionary Theory, and the Origins of Reciprocity , 2002 .

[72]  Steven Tadelis,et al.  The Market for Reputations as an Incentive Mechanism , 2001, Journal of Political Economy.

[73]  Joel Watson,et al.  Starting Small and Commitment , 1999, Games Econ. Behav..

[74]  C. Udry,et al.  Gender, Land Rights and Agriculture in Ghana∗ , 2002 .

[75]  Michihiro Kandori,et al.  Introduction to Repeated Games with Private Monitoring , 2002, J. Econ. Theory.

[76]  J. Mcmillan.  Reinventing the Bazaar: A Natural History of Markets , 2002 .

[77]  Juliette Rouchier,et al.  Rational Ritual: Culture, Co-ordination and Common Knowledge by Michael Suk-Young Chwe , 2002, J. Artif. Soc. Soc. Simul..

[78]  T. Okazaki.  The role of the merchant coalition in pre-modern Japanese economic development: an historical institutional analysis , 2005 .

[79]  M. Aoki,et al.  Toward a Comparative Institutional Analysis , 2002 .

[80]  E. Stringham,et al.  The Extralegal Development of Securities Trading in Seventeenth Century Amsterdam , 2001 .

[81]  Tridib Sharma,et al.  ENFORCING PROPERTY RIGHTS THROUGH REPUTATION: MEXICO'S EARLY INDUSTRIALIZATION, 1878–1913 , 2001, The Journal of Economic History.

[82]  James E. Rauch.  Business and Social Networks in International Trade , 2001 .

[83]  Gene M. Grossman,et al.  Special Interest Politics , 2001 .

[84]  Joel Watson,et al.  Strategy : An Introduction to Game Theory , 2001 .

[85]  Avinash Dixit,et al.  On Modes of Economic Governance , 2001, SSRN Electronic Journal.

[86]  Patrick O'Brien,et al.  Fiscal exceptionalism: Great Britain and its European rivals: from civil war to triumph at Trafalgar and Waterloo , 2001 .

[87]  S. Gächter,et al.  Reputation and Reciprocity: Consequences for the Labour Relation , 2001, SSRN Electronic Journal.

[88]  R. Kranton,et al.  A Theory of Buyer-Seller Networks , 2001 .

[89]  H. Young,et al.  Competition and Custom in Economic Contracts: A Case Study of Illinois Agriculture , 2001 .

[90]  M. Aoki,et al.  Communities and Markets in Economic Development , 2001 .

[91]  R. Boyd,et al.  In Search of Homo Economicus: Behavioral Experiments in 15 Small- Scale Societies , 2001 .

[92]  Oliver Hart,et al.  Norms and the Theory of the Firm , 2001 .

[93]  Benito Arruñada.  Property Enforcement as Organized Consent , 2001 .

[94]  G. Grossman,et al.  Integration vs. Outsourcing in Industry Equilibrium , 2001, SSRN Electronic Journal.

[95]  René M. Stulz,et al.  Culture, Openness, and Finance , 2001 .

[96]  Gerardo L. Munck.  Game Theory and Comparative Politics: New Perspectives and Old Concerns , 2001 .

[97]  R. Ball.  Individualism, Collectivism, and Economic Development , 2001 .

[98]  Cass R. Sunstein,et al.  Order Without Law , 2017 .

[99]  K. Pomeranz.  Is There An East Asian Development Path? Long-Term Comparisons, Constraints, And Continuities , 2001 .

[100]  John Hatcher,et al.  Modelling the Middle Ages: The History and Theory of England's Economic Development , 2001 .

[101]  K. Fadl.  Rebellion and Violence in Islamic Law , 2001 .

[102]  K. Pomeranz,et al.  The Great Divergence: China, Europe, and the Making of the Modern World Economy , 2001 .

[103]  K. Cook.  Trust in Society , 2001 .

[104]  Itzhak Gilboa,et al.  A theory of case-based decisions , 2001 .

[105]  Jean-Francois Richard,et al.  Economic Development, Legality and the Transplant Effect , 2003 .

[106]  Ş. Pamuk.  A Monetary History of the Ottoman Empire , 2002 .

[107]  G. Charness,et al.  Relative Payoffs and Happiness: An Experimental Study , 2001 .

[108]  U. Fischbacher,et al.  Are People Conditionally Cooperative? Evidence from a Public Goods Experiment , 2001 .

[109]  M. Rabin,et al.  Understanding Social Preference with Simple Tests , 2001 .

[110]  A. Greif,et al.  The fundamental problem of exchange: A research agenda in Historical Institutional Analysis , 2000 .

[111]  Thomas Plümper,et al.  Bringing Putnam to the European Regions , 2000 .

[112]  Jean-Philippe Platteau,et al.  Institutions, Social Norms and Economic Development , 2000 .

[113]  Jon Elster,et al.  Rational Choice History: A Case of Excessive Ambition , 2000, American Political Science Review.

[114]  O. Williamson.  The New Institutional Economics: Taking Stock, Looking Ahead , 2000 .

[115]  Stephan R. Epstein,et al.  Freedom and Growth: The Rise of States and Markets in Europe , 2000 .

[116]  The Political Economy of Democratic Institutions , 2000 .

[117]  George A. Akerlof,et al.  Economics and Identity , 2000 .

[118]  A. Muthoo.  On the foundations of basic property rights, Part I: A model of the state-of-nature with two players , 2000 .

[119]  P. Pierson.  Increasing Returns, Path Dependence, and the Study of Politics , 2000, American Political Science Review.

[120]  Yishay Yafeh,et al.  Institutions, Reforms, and Country Risk: Lessons from Japanese Government Debt in the Meiji Era , 2000, The Journal of Economic History.

[121]  Efe A. Ok,et al.  The Strategic Advantage of Negatively Interdependent Preferences , 2000, J. Econ. Theory.

[122]  James A. Robinson,et al.  The Colonial Origins of Comparative Development: An Empirical Investigation , 2000 .

[123]  Daron Acemoglu,et al.  Political Losers as a Barrier to Economic Development , 2000 .

[124]  Efe A. Ok,et al.  Evolution of Interdependent Preferences in Aggregative Games , 2000, Games Econ. Behav..

[125]  Gary E. Bolton,et al.  ERC: A Theory of Equity, Reciprocity, and Competition , 2000 .

[126]  John McMillan,et al.  Private Order Under Dysfunctional Public Order , 2000 .

[127]  J. Aron,et al.  Growth and Institutions: A Review of the Evidence , 2000 .

[128]  Lawrence J. Lau,et al.  Reform without Losers: An Interpretation of China's Dual‐Track Approach to Transition , 2000, Journal of Political Economy.

[129]  K. Olds,et al.  Economic Cooperation in 19th Century Taiwan: Religion and Informal Enforcement , 2000 .

[130]  Philip T. Hoffman,et al.  Priceless Markets: The Political Economy of Credit in Paris, 1660-1870 , 2000 .

[131]  J. Mahoney.  Path dependence in historical sociology , 2000 .

[132]  D. Fudenberg,et al.  Payoff Information and Self-Confirming Equilibrium , 1999 .

[133]  Maitreesh Ghatak,et al.  The economics of lending with joint liability: theory and practice 1 This version: May 1999. 1 , 1999 .

[134]  J. Diamond,et al.  Guns, Germs, and Steel: The Fates of Human Societies , 1999 .

[135]  P. Dasgupta,et al.  Social capital : a multifaceted perspective , 1999 .

[136]  D. North.  Institutions and Credible Commitment , 1999 .

[137]  B. Pleskovic.  Annual World Bank Conference on Development Economics 1997 , 1999 .

[138]  V. Nee,et al.  The new institutionalism in sociology , 1999 .

[139]  E. Fehr,et al.  Cooperation and Punishment in Public Goods Experiments , 1999, SSRN Electronic Journal.

[140]  Raja Kali.  Endogenous Business Networks , 1999 .

[141]  D. Wrong,et al.  The oversocialized conception of man , 1999 .

[142]  G. Maggi.  The Role of Multilateral Institutions in International Trade Cooperation , 1999 .

[143]  V. Smith,et al.  Social Distance and Other-Regarding Behavior in Dictator Games: Reply , 1999 .

[144]  B. Frey,et al.  Social Distance and Other-Regarding Behavior in Dictator Games: Comment , 1999 .

[145]  Eric Maskin,et al.  Unforeseen Contingencies and Incomplete Contracts , 1999 .

[146]  M. Kaneko,et al.  Inductive Game Theory: Discrimination and Prejudices , 1999 .

[147]  Ilya Segal,et al.  Complexity and Renegotiation: A Foundation for Incomplete Contracts , 1999 .

[148]  B. Weingast,et al.  The Politics of Interpretation: Rationality, Culture, and Transition , 1998 .

[149]  P. Hall,et al.  The Potential of Historical Institutionalism: A Response to Hay and Wincott , 1998 .

[150]  D. Lal.  Unintended Consequences: The Impact of Factor Endowments, Culture, and Politics on Long-Run Economic Performance , 1998 .

[151]  M. Aoki,et al.  The Institutional Foundations of East Asian Economic Development , 1998 .

[152]  P. Zak,et al.  Trust and Growth , 1998 .

[153]  R. Goodin,et al.  A new handbook of political science , 1998 .

[154]  S. Epstein.  Craft Guilds, Apprenticeship, and Technological Change in Preindustrial Europe , 1998, The Journal of Economic History.

[155]  Oliver Hart,et al.  Foundations of Incomplete Contracts , 1998 .

[156]  S. Lee,et al.  Reorient Global Economy in the Asian Age , 1998 .

[157]  B. Frey.  Not Just for the Money: An Economic Theory of Personal Motivation , 1998 .

[158]  Avner Greif.  Théorie des Jeux et Analyse Historique des Institutions. Les institutions économiques du Moyen Age , 1998, Annales. Histoire, Sciences Sociales.

[159]  Christopher Woodruff,et al.  Contract enforcement and trade liberalization in Mexico's footwear industry , 1998 .

[160]  James N. Conklin.  The Theory of Sovering Debt and Spain under Philip II , 1998, Journal of Political Economy.

[161]  Steven Shavell,et al.  The Economic Theory of Public Enforcement of Law , 1998 .

[162]  S. Kantor.  Politics and Property Rights: The Closing of the Open Range in the Postbellum South , 1998 .

[163]  D. Fudenberg,et al.  The Folk Theorem for Repeated Games with Discounting and Incomplete Information , 1998 .

[164]  D. M. Topkis.  Supermodularity and Complementarity , 1998 .

[165]  M. Woolcock.  Social capital and economic development: Toward a theoretical synthesis and policy framework , 1998 .

[166]  C. I. Jones,et al.  Why Do Some Countries Produce so Much More Output Per Worker than Others? , 1998 .

[167]  G. Clark.  Commons Sense: Common Property Rights, Efficiency, and Institutional Change , 1998, The Journal of Economic History.

[168]  E. Ostrom.  A Behavioral Approach to the Rational Choice Theory of Collective Action: Presidential Address, American Political Science Association, 1997 , 1998, American Political Science Review.

[169]  John McMillan,et al.  Interfirm Relationships and Informal Credit in Vietnam , 1998 .

[170]  E. Fehr.  A Theory of Fairness, Competition and Cooperation , 1998 .

[171]  Steven Tadelis,et al.  What's in a Name? Reputation as a Tradeable Asset , 1998 .

[172]  Stuart Banner.  The Origin of the New York Stock Exchange, 1791–1860 , 1998, The Journal of Legal Studies.

[173]  A. Greif,et al.  Historical and Comparative Institutional Analysis , 1998 .

[174]  Craig Muldrew.  The economy of obligation , 1998 .

[175]  Avner Ben-Ner,et al.  Economics, Values, and Organization , 1998 .

[176]  O. Williamson.  Transaction Cost Economics: How It Works; Where It is Headed , 1998 .

[177]  D. Fudenberg,et al.  The Theory of Learning in Games , 1998 .

[178]  G. Hodgson.  The Approach of Institutional Economics , 1998 .

[179]  A. Rubinstein.  Modeling Bounded Rationality , 1998 .

[180]  P. Gorski,et al.  Birth of the Leviathan: Building States and Regimes in Medieval and Early Modern Europe , 1998 .

[181]  P. Dasgupta,et al.  The Economics of Transnational Commons , 1997 .

[182]  A. Greif.  Self-Enforcing Political System and Economic Growth: Late Medieval Genoa , 1997 .

[183]  M. Macy.  IDENTITY, INTEREST AND EMERGENT RATIONALITY , 1997 .

[184]  Herschel I. Grossman.  "Make Us a King": Anarchy, Predation, and the State , 1997 .

[185]  A. Lindbeck,et al.  Incentives and Social Norms in Household Behavior , 1997 .

[186]  S. Quinn.  Goldsmith-Banking: Mutual Acceptance and Interbanker Clearing in Restoration London* , 1997 .

[187]  K. Clay.  Trade, Institutions, and Credit , 1997 .

[188]  Itai Sened,et al.  The Political Institution of Private Property , 1997 .

[189]  Ben Polak,et al.  A Model of a Predatory State , 1997 .

[190]  D. Jacoby.  Trade, Commodities and Shipping in the Medieval Mediterranean , 1997 .

[191]  Joel Watson,et al.  Starting Small and Renegotiation , 1997 .

[192]  Barry R. Weingast.  The Political Foundations of Democracy and the Rule of the Law , 1997, American Political Science Review.

[193]  Jiajie Zhang,et al.  The Nature of External Representations in Problem Solving , 1997, Cogn. Sci..

[194]  Philip T. Hoffman,et al.  Growth in a Traditional Society: The French Countryside, 1450-1815 , 1997 .

[195]  A. Greif.  Contracting , Enforcement , and Efficiency : Economics Beyond the Law , 1997 .

[196]  Jean Ensminger.  Changing Property Rights: Reconciling Formal and Informal Rights to Land in Africa , 1997 .

[197]  Epstein,et al.  Genoa and The Genoese, 958-1528 , 1997 .

[198]  Richard A. Posner,et al.  Social Norms and the Law: An Economic Approach , 1997 .

[199]  John V. C. Nye,et al.  The frontiers of the new institutional economics , 1997 .

[200]  Margaret Levi,et al.  Consent, dissent, and patriotism , 1997 .

[201]  F. Scharpf,et al.  Games real actors play , 1997 .

[202]  Amnon Rapoport,et al.  Order of play in strategically equivalent games in extensive form , 1997, Int. J. Game Theory.

[203]  K. Thelen.  Historical Institutionalism in comparative politics , 1997 .

[204]  M. Rabin.  Psychology and Economics , 1997 .

[205]  A. Greif.  On the Interrelations and Economic Implications of Economic , Social , Political , and Normative Factors : Reflections From Two Late Medieval Societies , 1997 .

[206]  O. Williamson,et al.  The mechanisms of governance , 1996 .

[207]  S. Nicholas,et al.  Theory and history: seventeenth-century joint-stock chartered trading companies , 1996, The Journal of Economic History.

[208]  James D. Fearon,et al.  Explaining Interethnic Cooperation , 1996, American Political Science Review.

[209]  R. Stark,et al.  The Rise of Christianity: A Sociologist Reconsiders History. , 1997 .

[210]  P. Hall,et al.  Political Science and the Three New Institutionalisms , 1996 .

[211]  K. Binmore.  A note on backward induction , 1996 .

[212]  Audrey B. Davidson,et al.  Sacred Trust: The Medieval Church as an Economic Firm , 1996 .

[213]  V. Smith,et al.  On expectations and the monetary stakes in ultimatum games , 1996 .

[214]  R. Kranton.  Reciprocal Exchange: A Self-Sustaining System , 1996 .

[215]  Richard M. Wunderli.  A Medieval Mercantile Community: The Grocers' Company and the Politics and Trade of London, 1000–1485 , 1996 .

[216]  Rachel E. Kranton,et al.  The Formation of Cooperative Relationships , 1996 .

[217]  S. Skaperdas.  Contest success functions , 1996 .

[218]  John McGee,et al.  A LONGITUDINAL STUDY OF THE COMPETITIVE POSITIONS AND ENTRY PATHS OF EUROPEAN FIRMS IN THE U.S. PHARMACEUTICAL MARKET , 1996 .

[219]  G. Hamilton.  The Organizational Foundations of Western and Chinese Commerce: A Historical and Comparative Analysis , 1996 .

[220]  R. Lopez.  Storia delle colonie genovesi nel Mediterraneo , 1996 .

[221]  Itai Sened,et al.  Explaining social institutions , 1996 .

[222]  Jean Tirole,et al.  A Theory of Collective Reputations (with applications to the persistence of corruption and to firm quality) , 1996 .

[223]  D. Mueller.  Perspectives on public choice : a handbook , 1996 .

[224]  Jeffrey S. Friedman.  The rational choice controversy : economic models of politics reconsidered , 1996 .

[225]  J. Conlisk.  Why Bounded Rationality , 1996 .

[226]  Steffen Huck,et al.  The Indirect Evolutionary Approach to Explaining Fair Allocations , 1999 .

[227]  J. Searle.  The Construction of Social Reality , 1997 .

[228]  J. Kagel,et al.  Handbook of Experimental Economics , 1997 .

[229]  Debraj Ray,et al.  Cooperation in Community Interaction Without Information Flows , 1996 .

[230]  S. Brittan,et al.  Market Capitalism and Moral Values , 1996 .

[231]  Werner Güth,et al.  An evolutionary approach to explaining cooperative behavior by reciprocal incentives , 1995 .

[232]  Herschel I. Grossman,et al.  Swords or Plowshares? A Theory of the Security of Claims to Property , 1995, Journal of Political Economy.

[233]  A. Greif,et al.  Trust, Ethnicity, and Identity , 1995 .

[234]  T. Kuran,et al.  Private Truths, Public Lies: The Social Consequences of Preference Falsification , 1995 .

[235]  Oliver Hart,et al.  Firms, contracts, and financial structure , 1995 .

[236]  E. Ostrom,et al.  A Grammar of Institutions , 1995, American Political Science Review.

[237]  R. Aumann,et al.  Epistemic Conditions for Nash Equilibrium , 1995 .

[238]  W. Scott,et al.  Institutions and Organizations. , 1995 .

[239]  F. Bouman.  Rotating and accumulating savings and credit associations: A development perspective , 1995 .

[240]  E. Lazear.  Economic Transition in Eastern Europe and Russia: Realities of Reform , 1995 .

[241]  Paul Milgrom,et al.  Complementarities and fit strategy, structure, and organizational change in manufacturing , 1995 .

[242]  Stephen Coate,et al.  Group lending, repayment incentives and social collateral , 1995 .

[243]  J. Laffont.  Advances in Economic Theory , 1995 .

[244]  A. I. Gurevich,et al.  The origins of European individualism , 1995 .

[245]  Monika Schnitzer,et al.  Tying Trade Flows: A Theory of Countertrade with Evidence , 1995 .

[246]  Carsten Herrmann-Pillath.  On the importance of studying Late Quing economic and social history for the analysis of contemporary China or: Protecting sinology against social science , 1995 .

[247]  F. Fukuyama.  Trust: The Social Virtues and the Creation of Prosperity Penguin London , 1995 .

[248]  K. NieropvanH.F..  The Dutch Republic. Its rise, greatness, and fall , 1995 .

[249]  A. Roth,et al.  Learning in Extensive-Form Games: Experimental Data and Simple Dynamic Models in the Intermediate Term* , 1995 .

[250]  Ken Binmore,et al.  Learning to be imperfect: The ultimatum game , 1995 .

[251]  Werner Güth,et al.  Is altruism evolutionarily stable , 1998 .

[252]  Hendrik Spruyt.  The Sovereign State and Its Competitors , 1997 .

[253]  W. Arthur,et al.  Increasing Returns and Path Dependence in the Economy , 1996 .

[254]  Jörgen W. Weibull,et al.  Evolutionary Game Theory , 1996 .

[255]  P. David.  Why are institutions the ‘carriers of history’?: Path dependence and the evolution of conventions, organizations and institutions , 1994 .

[256]  Kevin McCabe,et al.  Preferences, property rights, and anonymity in bargaining games , 1994 .

[257]  A. Greif.  Cultural Beliefs and the Organization of Society: A Historical and Theoretical Reflection on Collectivist and Individualist Societies , 1994, Journal of Political Economy.

[258]  Samuel B. Bacharach,et al.  Research In The Sociology Of Organizations , 1998 .

[259]  A. Bittles.  The Role and Significance of Consanguinity as a Demographic Variable , 1994 .

[260]  Diego Gambetta,et al.  The Sicilian mafia: the business of private protection , 1994 .

[261]  M. Aoki.  THE CONTINGENT GOVERNANCE OF TEAMS: ANALYSIS OF INSTITUTIONAL COMPLEMENTARITY , 1994 .

[262]  Paul R. Milgrom,et al.  Coordination, Commitment, and Enforcement: The Case of the Merchant Guild , 1994, Journal of Political Economy.

[263]  J. Platteau.  Behind the market stage where real societies exist ‐ part II: The role of moral norms , 1994 .

[264]  David S. Spear.  The Peace of God: Social Violence and Religious Response in France around the Year 1000 , 1994 .

[265]  Glenn Ellison.  Cooperation in the Prisoner's Dilemma with Anonymous Random Matching , 1994 .

[266]  A. Greif,et al.  On the Political Foundations of the Late Medieval Commercial Revolution: Genoa During the Twelfth and Thirteenth Centuries , 1994, The Journal of Economic History.

[267]  M. Fafchamps,et al.  Enterprise finance in Kenya , 1994 .

[268]  J. Horowitz,et al.  Fairness in Simple Bargaining Experiments , 1994 .

[269]  M. Rabin.  Cognitive Dissonance and Social Change , 1994 .

[270]  Hilton L. Root.  The Fountain of Privilege: Political Foundations of Markets in Old Regime France and England , 1994 .

[271]  T. Guinnane.  A Failed Institutional Transplant: Raiffeisen′s Credit Cooperatives in Ireland, 1894-1914 , 1994 .

[272]  Richard R. Nelson,et al.  The Co-evolution of Technology, Industrial Structure, and Supporting Institutions , 1994 .

[273]  Marshall B. Reinsdorf.  New Evidence on the Relation between Inflation and Price Dispersion , 1994 .

[274]  N. Smelser,et al.  Handbook of Economic Sociology , 1994 .

[275]  Paul R. Milgrom,et al.  Monotone Comparative Statics , 1994 .

[276]  Frank Dobbin,et al.  Forging Industrial Policy: The United States, Britain, and France in the Railway Age , 1994 .

[277]  E. Bacha.  Economics in a Changing World , 1994 .

[278]  D. Fudenberg,et al.  Digitized by the Internet Archive in 2011 with Funding from Working Paper Department of Economics the Folk Theorem with Imperfect Public Information , 2022 .

[279]  D. North,et al.  Economic performance through time , 2012 .

[280]  Howard Margolis,et al.  Paradigms and Barriers: How Habits of Mind Govern Scientific Beliefs , 1995 .

[281]  D. North,et al.  Shared Mental Models: Ideologies and Institutions , 1994 .

[282]  B. Downing.  The Military Revolution and Political Change , 1993 .

[283]  T. Kuran.  The Unthinkable and the Unthought , 1993 .

[284]  Edward L. Ayers.  The Burden of Dependency: Colonial Themes in Southern Economic Thought. By Joseph J. Persky. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1992. Pp. xi, 183. $28.50 , 1993, The Journal of Economic History.

[285]  Glenn Ellison.  Learning, Local Interaction, and Coordination , 1993 .

[286]  M. Olson.  Dictatorship, Democracy, and Development , 1993, American Political Science Review.

[287]  E. Kalai,et al.  Subjective Equilibrium in Repeated Games , 1993 .

[288]  E. Kalai,et al.  Rational Learning Leads to Nash Equilibrium , 1993 .

[289]  Z. Razi.  The myth of the immutable english family , 1993 .

[290]  E. Kalai,et al.  Subjective Games and Equilibria , 1993 .

[291]  Chaim Fershtman,et al.  SOCIAL STATUS, CULTURE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE* , 1993 .

[292]  J. Schacht.  An introduction to Islamic law , 1993 .

[293]  A. Banerjee,et al.  Occupational Choice and the Process of Development , 1993, Journal of Political Economy.

[294]  Robert Powell,et al.  Guns, Butter, and Anarchy , 1993, American Political Science Review.

[295]  A. Greif.  Contract Enforceability and Economic Institutions in Early Trade: the Maghribi Traders' Coalition , 1993 .

[296]  R. Putnam.  Making Democracy Work , 1993 .

[297]  D. Fudenberg,et al.  Self-confirming equilibrium , 1993 .

[298]  O. Williamson.  Transaction Cost Economics and Organization Theory , 1993 .

[299]  Arnold W.A. Boot,et al.  Reputation and discretion in financial contracting , 1993 .

[300]  Paul A. Samuelson,et al.  Altruism as a problem involving group versus individual selection in economics and biology , 1993 .

[301]  B. Weingast.  Constitutions as Governance Structures: The Political Foundations of Secure Markets , 1993 .

[302]  M. Rabin.  Published by: American , 2022 .

[303]  H. Young,et al.  The Evolution of Conventions , 1993 .

[304]  R. Rob,et al.  Learning, Mutation, and Long Run Equilibria in Games , 1993 .

[305]  W. Powell,et al.  The New Institutionalism in Organizational Analysis , 1993 .

[306]  Harold L. Cole,et al.  Social Norms, Savings Behavior, and Growth , 1992, Journal of Political Economy.

[307]  James Buchanan Given,et al.  The Commercialisation of English Society, 1000-1500 , 1992 .

[308]  John Sutton,et al.  Sunk Costs and Market Structure: Price Competition, Advertising, and the Evolution of Concentration , 1992 .

[309]  V. Erlmann.  “the past is far and the future is far”: power and performance among Zulu migrant workers , 1992 .

[310]  J. Knight.  Institutions and Social Conflict , 1992 .

[311]  Hamish Stewart.  Rationality and the market for human blood , 1992 .

[312]  S. Epstein,et al.  Wage Labor and Guilds in Medieval Europe. , 1992 .

[313]  Daniel B. KLElN.  Promise Keeping in the Great Society: A Model of Credit Information Sharing , 1992 .

[314]  R. McKelvey,et al.  An experimental study of the centipede game , 1992 .

[315]  D. North.  Institutions and Economic Theory , 1992 .

[316]  Paul R. Milgrom,et al.  Economics, Organization and Management , 1992 .

[317]  G. J. Miller,et al.  Managerial Dilemmas: The Political Economy of Hierarchy. , 1992 .

[318]  Lisa E. Bernstein.  Opting out of the Legal System: Extralegal Contractual Relations in the Diamond Industry , 1992, The Journal of Legal Studies.

[319]  Michael Hechter,et al.  The Insufficiency of Game Theory for the Resolution of Real-World Collective Action Problems , 1992 .

[320]  R. Calvert,et al.  Leadership and Its Basis in Problems of Social Coordination , 1992 .

[321]  W. Sewell.  A Theory of Structure: Duality, Agency, and Transformation , 1989, American Journal of Sociology.

[322]  H. Berman,et al.  A short history of Western legal theory , 1992 .

[323]  R. Gibbons.  Game theory for applied economists , 1992 .

[324]  A. Greif,et al.  Institutions and International Trade: Lessons from the Commercial Revolution , 1992 .

[325]  L. Cosmides,et al.  The Adapted mind : evolutionary psychology and the generation of culture , 1992 .

[326]  Michihiro Kandori.  Social Norms and Community Enforcement , 1992 .

[327]  Z. Çelik,et al.  Cities and Caliphs: On the Genesis of Arab Muslim Urbanism , 1992 .

[328]  P. Bardhan.  The economic theory of agrarian institutions , 1991 .

[329]  B. Lewis,et al.  The Political Language of Islam. , 1991 .

[330]  Philip T. Hoffman.  Land Rents and Agricultural Productivity: The Paris Basin, 1450–1789 , 1991, The Journal of Economic History.

[331]  S. Zamir,et al.  Bargaining and Market Behavior in Jerusalem, Ljubljana, Pittsburgh, and Tokyo: An Experimental Study , 1991 .

[332]  David Pearce,et al.  Information and timing in repeated partnerships , 1991 .

[333]  J. Elliott.  Liberty in Absolutist Spain: The Habsburg Sale of Towns, 1516-1700.Helen Nader , 1991, Renaissance Quarterly.

[334]  G. Clark.  Yields per acre in English agriculture, 1250-1860: evidence from labour inputs , 1991 .

[335]  A. Przeworski,et al.  Democracy and the Market: Political and Economic Reforms in Eastern Europe and Latin America , 1991 .

[336]  A. Rubinstein.  COMMENTS ON THE INTERPRETATION OF GAME THEORY , 1991 .

[337]  Earl A. Thompson,et al.  A new theory of guilds and european economic development , 1991 .

[338]  A. Dixit,et al.  Thinking Strategically: The Competitive Edge in Business, Politics, and Everyday Life , 1991 .

[339]  J. Ramseyer.  Legal Rules in Repeated Deals: Banking in the Shadow of Defection in Japan , 1991, The Journal of Legal Studies.

[340]  James D. Fearon,et al.  Counterfactuals and Hypothesis Testing in Political Science , 1991, World Politics.

[341]  G. Hamilton.  Business networks and economic development in East and Southeast Asia , 1991 .

[342]  S. Skaperdas.  Cooperation, Conflict, and Power in the Absence of Property Rights , 1991 .

[343]  P. Spufford.  A history of Venice , 1991 .

[344]  Paul R. Milgrom,et al.  Complementarities, Momentum, and the Evolution of Modern Manufacturing , 1991 .

[345]  Neil Fligstein,et al.  FROM THE TRANSFORMATION OF CORPORATE CONTROL , 2021, The New Economic Sociology.

[346]  D. North.  Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance: Economic performance , 1990 .

[347]  Joel Mokyr,et al.  The Lever of Riches: Technological Creativity and Economic Progress , 1991 .

[348]  Thráinn Eggertsson,et al.  Economic behavior and institutions , 1991 .

[349]  David M. Kreps,et al.  A Course in Microeconomic Theory , 2020 .

[350]  J. Coleman.  Foundations of Social Theory , 1990 .

[351]  Mark T. Keane,et al.  Cognitive Psychology: A Student's Handbook , 1990 .

[352]  R. Hinde,et al.  Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action Collective Action , 2010 .

[353]  Paul R. Milgrom,et al.  Rationalizability, Learning, and Equilibrium in Games with Strategic Complementarities , 1990 .

[354]  R. Lopez,et al.  Medieval trade in the Mediterranean world , 1990 .

[355]  B. Lewis.  Race and Slavery in the Middle East , 1990 .

[356]  W. Dugger,et al.  The New Institutionalism: New But Not Institutionalist , 1990 .

[357]  T. Parsons.  Prolegomena to a Theory of Social Institutions , 1990 .

[358]  Janet L. Abu-Lughod,et al.  Before European Hegemony: The World System A.D. 1250-1350 , 1990, The Journal of Asian Studies.

[359]  Dilip Mookherjee,et al.  Norms, Third-Party Sanctions, and Cooperation , 1990 .

[360]  Paul R. Milgrom,et al.  The role of institutions in the revival of trade: the law merchant , 1990 .

[361]  M. Whinston,et al.  Multimarket Contact and Collusive Behavior , 1990 .

[362]  C. Tilly.  Coercion, Capital, and European States, AD 990–1992 , 1990 .

[363]  H. Hollander.  A Social Exchange Approach to Voluntary Cooperation , 1990 .

[364]  K. Shepsle,et al.  Perspectives on Positive Political Economy: REFLECTIONS ON THEORETICAL FOUNDATIONS , 1990 .

[365]  A. Greif.  Reputation and Coalitions in Medieval Trade: Evidence on the Maghribi Traders , 1989, The Journal of Economic History.

[366]  John A. Weinberg,et al.  Optimal Contracts under Costly State Falsification , 1989, Journal of Political Economy.

[367]  Douglass C. North,et al.  Constitutions and Commitment: The Evolution of Institutions Governing Public Choice in Seventeenth-Century England , 1989, The Journal of Economic History.

[368]  Debraj Ray,et al.  Collective Dynamic Consistency in Repeated Games , 1989 .

[369]  Hilton L. Root.  Tying the King's Hands , 1989 .

[370]  Ulrike Schaede.  Forwards and futures in tokugawa-period Japan:A new perspective on the Dōjima rice market , 1989 .

[371]  L. Thompson,et al.  Social Utility and Decision Making in Interpersonal Contexts , 1989 .

[372]  E. Jones,et al.  Pre-Industrial Economic Growth: Social Organization and Technological Progress in Europe. , 1989 .

[373]  J. Elster.  The cement of society : a study of social order , 1989 .

[374]  Hal R. Varian,et al.  MONITORING AGENTS WITH OTHER AGENTS , 1989 .

[375]  J. Geanakoplos,et al.  Psychological games and sequential rationality , 1989 .

[376]  W. MacLeod,et al.  Implicit Contracts, Incentive Com-patibility, and Involuntary Unemployment , 1989 .

[377]  N. Stillman,et al.  Palestine during the First Muslim Period (634-1099) , 1989 .

[378]  B. Parekh.  Theory of the State , 1989 .

[379]  Johan P. Olsen,et al.  Rediscovering institutions: The organizational basis of politics , 1989 .

[380]  Bernard Grofman,et al.  The Federalist Papers and the new institutionalism , 1989 .

[381]  Bruce L. Benson,et al.  The Spontaneous Evolution of Commercial Law , 1989 .

[382]  H. Triandis.  Cross-cultural studies of individualism and collectivism. , 1989, Nebraska Symposium on Motivation. Nebraska Symposium on Motivation.

[383]  D. Irwin.  Welfare Effects of British Free Trade: Debate and Evidence from the 1840s , 1988, Journal of Political Economy.

[384]  Philip T. Hoffman.  Institutions and Agriculture in Old Regime France , 1988 .

[385]  Dilip Abreu.  On the Theory of Infinitely Repeated Games with Discounting , 1988 .

[386]  Barry R. Weingast,et al.  The Industrial Organization of Congress; or, Why Legislatures, Like Firms, Are Not Organized as Markets , 1988, Journal of Political Economy.

[387]  Edward D. English.  Enterprise and Liability in Sienese Banking, 1230-1350 , 1988 .

[388]  A. Udovitch.  Merchants and Amirs: Government and Trade in Eleventh Century Egypt , 1988 .

[389]  I. Lapidus.  A history of Islamic societies , 1988 .

[390]  Joseph Zeira,et al.  Income Distribution and Macroeconomics , 1988 .

[391]  W. Arthur,et al.  The Economy as an Evolving Complex System II , 1988 .

[392]  Eric Maskin,et al.  Renegotiation in Repeated Games , 1987 .

[393]  David J. Langum.  Law and Community on the Mexican California Frontier: Anglo American Expatriates and the Clash of Legal Traditions, 1821-1846 , 1987 .

[394]  W. Dugger.  The Economic Institutions of Capitalism , 1987 .

[395]  C. Bull.  The Existence of Self-Enforcing Implicit Contracts , 1987 .

[396]  Hilmar C. Krueger.  The Genoese Exportation of Northern Cloths to Mediterranean Ports, Twelfth Century , 1987 .

[397]  E. Damme.  Stability and perfection of Nash equilibria , 1987 .

[398]  Bo Gustafsson,et al.  The rise and economic behaviour of medieval craft guilds an economic-theoretical interpretation , 1987 .

[399]  R. Frank.  If Homo Economicus Could Choose His Own Utility Function, Would He Want One with a Conscience? Reply , 1987 .

[400]  J. Beattie,et al.  Crime and the Courts in England 1660-1800 , 1986 .

[401]  Paolo Leon.  The Economic Institutions of Capitalism , 1986, The Antitrust Bulletin.

[402]  Sanford J. Grossman,et al.  The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration , 1986 .

[403]  M. Abramovitz.  Catching Up, Forging Ahead, and Falling Behind , 1986, The Journal of Economic History.

[404]  E. Stacchetti,et al.  Optimal cartel equilibria with imperfect monitoring , 1986 .

[405]  U. Witt.  Evolution and Stability of Cooperation without Enforceable Contracts , 1986 .

[406]  Drew Fudenberg,et al.  The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Discounting or with Incomplete Information , 1986 .

[407]  Ann Swidler.  CULTURE IN ACTION: SYMBOLS AND STRATEGIES* , 1986 .

[408]  Jacques Cremer,et al.  Cooperation in Ongoing Organizations , 1986 .

[409]  D. Negri,et al.  Storia di Genova , 1986 .

[410]  Janet L. Yellen,et al.  Efficiency Wage Models of the Labor Market , 1986 .

[411]  Richard A. Shweder,et al.  Culture theory : essays on mind, self, and emotion , 1986 .

[412]  Gabriella Airaldi.  Genova e la Liguria nel medioèvo , 1986 .

[413]  S. Epstein,et al.  Wills and Wealth in Medieval Genoa, 1150-1250 , 1986 .

[414]  Mark S. Granovetter.  Economic Action and Social Structure: The Problem of Embeddedness , 1985, American Journal of Sociology.

[415]  Jon Elster,et al.  Explaining technical change : a case study in the philosophy of science , 1985 .

[416]  Vijay Krishna,et al.  Finitely Repeated Games , 1985 .

[417]  Nathan Rosenberg,et al.  How the West Grew Rich , 1985 .

[418]  Jack Hirshleifer,et al.  The Expanding Domain of Economics , 1985 .

[419]  D. Abulafia.  Catalan Merchants and the Western Mediterranean, 1236-1300: Studies in the Notarial Acts of Barcelona and Sicily , 1985 .

[420]  P. David.  Clio and the Economics of QWERTY , 1985 .

[421]  George A. Akerlof.  An economic theorist's book of tales , 1984 .

[422]  B. Bernheim.  Rationalizable Strategic Behavior , 1984 .

[423]  David Pearce.  Rationalizable Strategic Behavior and the Problem of Perfection , 1984 .

[424]  F. Lichtenberg.  The Relationship between Federal Contract R&D and Company R&D , 1984 .

[425]  C. Shapiro,et al.  Equilibrium Unemployment as a Worker Discipline Device , 1984 .

[426]  R. Porter,et al.  NONCOOPERATIVE COLLUSION UNDER IMPERFECT PRICE INFORMATION , 1984 .

[427]  Jack Goody,et al.  The Development of the Family and Marriage in Europe. , 1984 .

[428]  E. Damme.  Refinements of the Nash Equilibrium Concept , 1983 .

[429]  C. Shapiro.  Premiums for High Quality Products as Returns to Reputations , 1983 .

[430]  Ross L. Watts,et al.  Agency Problems, Auditing, and the Theory of the Firm: Some Evidence , 1983, The Journal of Law and Economics.

[431]  Harold J. Berman,et al.  Law and Revolution: The Formation of the Western Legal Tradition , 1983 .

[432]  Leon Trakman,et al.  The law merchant : the evolution of commercial law , 1983 .

[433]  S. Winter,et al.  An evolutionary theory of economic change , 1983 .

[434]  Robert D. Tollison,et al.  The Rise and Decline of Nations , 1983 .

[435]  Nathan Rosenberg,et al.  Inside the black box , 1983 .

[436]  R. Allen.  The Efficiency and Distributional Consequences of Eighteenth Century Enclosures , 1982 .

[437]  Paul R. Milgrom,et al.  Predation, reputation, and entry deterrence☆ , 1982 .

[438]  David M. Kreps,et al.  Rational cooperation in the finitely repeated prisoners' dilemma , 1982 .

[439]  P. Laslett,et al.  The European Family , 1982 .

[440]  Patrick O'Brien,et al.  European Economic Development: The Contribution of the Periphery* , 1982 .

[441]  D. North.  Structure and Change in Economic History , 1983 .

[442]  Donald L. Mills,et al.  Organizations: Rational, Natural and Open Systems , 1983 .

[443]  B. Klein,et al.  The Role of Market Forces in Assuring Contractual Performance , 1981, Journal of Political Economy.

[444]  G. W. Day.  The Impact of the Third Crusade upon Trade with the Levant , 1981 .

[445]  A. Field.  The Problem with Neoclassical Institutional Economics: A Critique with Special Reference to the North/Thomas Model of Pre-1500 Europe , 1981 .

[446]  A. Schotter.  The Economic Theory of Social Institutions , 1981 .

[447]  A. Tversky,et al.  The framing of decisions and the psychology of choice. , 1981, Science.

[448]  Abram Bergson,et al.  Economic welfare and the economics of Soviet socialism : essays in honor of Abram Bergson , 1981 .

[449]  L. Cavalli-Sforza.  Cultural transmission and evolution , 1981 .

[450]  R. D. Face.  Secular history in twelfth-century Italy: Caffaro of Genoa , 1980 .

[451]  L. Telser.  A Theory of Self-enforcing Agreements , 1980 .

[452]  R. Townsend.  Optimal contracts and competitive markets with costly state verification , 1979 .

[453]  K. Shepsle.  Institutional Arrangements and Equilibrium in Multidimensional Voting Models , 1979 .

[454]  John S. Pettengill.  The Impact of Military Technology on European Income Distribution , 1979 .

[455]  Gabriella Rossetti Pepe.  Pisa nei secoli XI e XII : formazione e caratteri di una classe di governo , 1979 .

[456]  W. J. Jones.  The foundations of English bankruptcy : statutes and commissions in the early modern period , 1979 .

[457]  D. C. Coleman,et al.  The Cambridge Economic History of Europe , 1978 .

[458]  Richard W. Bulliet,et al.  The Venture of Islam , 1978 .

[459]  J. Cottingham.  LAW, LEGISLATION AND LIBERTY , 1978 .

[460]  Alan Macfarlane,et al.  The Origins Of English Individualism , 1978 .

[461]  D. Nicholas,et al.  Parties and political life in the medieval West , 1979 .

[462]  Harry A. Miskimin,et al.  The Medieval City , 1979 .

[463]  M. Urbański,et al.  "Merchants in crisis : genoese and venetian men of affairs and the fourteenth-century depression", Benjamin Z. Kedar, New Haven and London 1976 : [recenzja] / Marian Dygo, Marek Urbański. , 1977 .

[464]  Finn E. Kydland,et al.  Rules Rather than Discretion: The Inconsistency of Optimal Plans , 1977, Journal of Political Economy.

[465]  S. Gould,et al.  Punctuated equilibria: the tempo and mode of evolution reconsidered , 1977, Paleobiology.

[466]  H. Gintis,et al.  Schooling in capitalist America : educational reform and the contradictions of economic life , 1977 .

[467]  Edna Ullmann-Margalit,et al.  The Emergence Of Norms , 1977 .

[468]  A. Bandura.  Social learning theory , 1977 .

[469]  D. Nicholas,et al.  The Commercial Revolution of the Middle Ages, 950-1350 , 1976 .

[470]  Douglass C. North,et al.  The rise of the western world , 1976 .

[471]  C. Cipolla.  Before the Industrial Revolution , 1975 .

[472]  N. Pounds,et al.  An Economic History of Medieval Europe. , 1977 .

[473]  P. Nelson.  Advertising as Information , 1974, Journal of Political Economy.

[474]  G. Becker,et al.  A Theory of Social Interactions , 1974, Journal of Political Economy.

[475]  B. Westman.  The Peasant Family and Crime in Fourteenth-Century England , 1974, Journal of British Studies.

[476]  W. M. Watt.  Muhammad: prophet and statesman. , 1974 .

[477]  J. Strayer,et al.  Letters of Medieval Jewish Traders , 1974 .

[478]  K. Arrow.  The limits of organization , 1974 .

[479]  D. Hughes.  Toward Historical Ethnography: Notarial Records and Family History in the Middle Ages , 1974 .

[480]  F. Lane.  Venice, A Maritime Republic , 1975 .

[481]  J. Lee Shneidman,et al.  The Rise of the Western World: A New Economic History , 1973 .

[482]  H. Finberg,et al.  English medieval boroughs;: A handlist , 1973 .

[483]  M. Postan.  Medieval Trade And Finance , 1973 .

[484]  W. M. Watt.  The Influence of Islam on Medieval Europe , 2019 .

[485]  D. Herlihy,et al.  Economy, Society, and Government in Medieval Italy: Essays in Memory of Robert L. Reynolds , 1972 .

[486]  C. Morris.  The discovery of the individual, 1050-1200 , 1972 .

[487]  B. Lewis,et al.  The Cambridge History of Islam , 1971 .

[488]  Abraham L. Udovitch,et al.  Partnership and Profit in Medieval Islam , 1971 .

[489]  J. Friedman.  A Non-cooperative Equilibrium for Supergames , 1971 .

[490]  I. Colvin.  The Germans in England, 1066-1598 , 1971 .

[491]  David Lewis.  Convention: A Philosophical Study , 1986 .

[492]  P. Dollinger.  The German Hansa , 1970 .

[493]  John Hicks,et al.  A Theory of Economic History , 1970 .

[494]  Fritz Rörig.  The medieval town , 1969 .

[495]  W. Butler.  The Lombard Communes: A History of the Republics of North Italy , 1969 .

[496]  A. Stinchcombe.  Constructing Social Theories , 1970 .

[497]  Alfred E. Lieber.  Eastern Business Practices and Medieval European Commerce , 1968 .

[498]  Peter Stein,et al.  Roman law in European history , 1968 .

[499]  Napoleon A. Chagnon,et al.  Yanomamo: The Fierce People , 1968 .

[500]  H. Garfinkel.  Studies in Ethnomethodology , 1968 .

[501]  P. Berger,et al.  Social Construction of Reality , 1991, The SAGE International Encyclopedia of Mass Media and Society.

[502]  Eric E. Lampard,et al.  Muslim Cities in the Later Middle Ages , 1968 .

[503]  R. Lopez,et al.  The birth of Europe , 1966 .

[504]  Richard D. Face,et al.  Les Douanes De Genes, 1376-1377 , 1965 .

[505]  A. Pertile.  Storia del diritto italiano : dalla caduta dell'impero romano alla codificazione , 1965 .

[506]  R. Latouche.  La Bibliographie Géographique Internationale 1962. , 1965 .

[507]  William M. Bowsky.  Nobiltà e popolo nel Comune di Pisa , 1964 .

[508]  R. Warren,et al.  The community in America , 1964 .

[509]  R. D. Roover.  The Rise and Decline of the Medici Bank, 1397-1494 , 1964 .

[510]  A. J. Taylor.  Rugged Individualism Reconsidered , 1963 .

[511]  Stewart Macaulay.  Non-contractual relations in business: a preliminary study , 1963 .

[512]  Stewart Macauley,et al.  Noncontractual Relations in Business: A Preliminary Study , 1963 .

[513]  H. Hearder,et al.  A short history of Italy, from classical times to the present day , 1963 .

[514]  E H BEALING,et al.  On to the community. , 2018, Nursing times.

[515]  A. Udovitch.  At the Origins of the Western Commenda: Islam, Israel, Byzantium? , 1962, Speculum.

[516]  G. Luzzatto.  An economic history of Italy; from the fall of the Roman Empire to the beginning of the sixteenth century , 1961 .

[517]  T. Schelling,et al.  The Strategy of Conflict. , 1961 .

[518]  N. D. Lattin.  The law of corporations , 1960 .

[519]  S. Lipset.  Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development and Political Legitimacy , 1959, American Political Science Review.

[520]  Edmond-René Labande.  Studi in onore di Armando Sapori. , 1959 .

[521]  TECHNIQUES OF BUSINESS IN THE TRADE BETWEEN THE FAIRS OF CHAMPAGNE AND THE SOUTH OF EUROPE IN THE TWELFTH AND THIRTEENTH CENTURIES , 1958 .

[522]  W. Fischel.  The Spice Trade in Mamluk Egypt: A Contribution to the Economic History of Medieval Islam , 1958 .

[523]  D. Herlihy.  The Agrarian Revolution in Southern France and Italy, 801-1150 , 1958, Speculum.

[524]  V. Vitale,et al.  Breviario della Storia di Genova , 1957 .

[525]  B. Lewis.  The Muslim Discovery of Europe , 1957, Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies.

[526]  P. J. Idenburg,et al.  Colonial Policy and Practice; A Comparative Study of Burma and Netherlands India , 1948, The Journal of Asian Studies.

[527]  W. Fischel.  The Spice Trade in Mamluk Egypt , 1957 .

[528]  S. Goitein.  New Light On the Beginnings of the Karim Merchants , 1957 .

[529]  A History Of Europe , 1956 .

[530]  H. Simon,et al.  A Behavioral Model of Rational Choice , 1955 .

[531]  L. J. Savage,et al.  The Foundations of Statistics , 1955 .

[532]  E. Durkheim.  Sociology and Philosophy , 1954 .

[533]  Alfred G. Meyer,et al.  Culture, a critical review of concepts and definitions , 1953 .

[534]  Russell Smith,et al.  Government and the Economy , 1947 .

[535]  T. Parsons.  The Social System , 1953 .

[536]  A. Lewis.  Naval power and trade in the Mediterranean A.D. 500-1100 , 1951 .

[537]  Marcel Bataillon.  Obras nueuamente imprimidas assi en prosa como en metro de Moner, las mas dellas en lengua castellana y algunas en su lengua natural Catalana , 1951 .

[538]  V. Vitale.  Il comune del podestà a Genova , 1951 .

[539]  M. Weber.  Methodology of Social Sciences , 1949 .

[540]  T. Plucknett,et al.  Legislation of Edward I , 1949 .

[541]  C. Mills,et al.  The Theory of Social and Economic Organization , 1948 .

[542]  F. Lane.  Family Partnerships and Joint Ventures in the Venetian Republic , 1944, The Journal of Economic History.

[543]  R. Lopez.  European Merchants in the Medieval Indies: The Evidence of Commercial Documents , 1943, The Journal of Economic History.

[544]  Business and Capitalism: An Introduction to Business History , 1939 .

[545]  E. C. Hughes,et al.  Institutional Office and the Person , 1937, American Journal of Sociology.

[546]  R. Coase.  The Nature of the Firm , 1937 .

[547]  E. Kayser.  History of Florence from the founding of the city through the Renaissance , 1937 .

[548]  F. Hayek.  Economics and knowledge , 1937 .

[549]  Henri Pirenne,et al.  Mohammed and Charlemagne , 1937 .

[550]  H. Rashdall,et al.  The Universities of Europe in the Middle Ages by Hastings Rashdall , 2010 .

[551]  G. Mead.  Mind, Self, and Society: From the Standpoint of a Social Behaviorist (Works of George Herbert Mead, Vol. 1) , 1934 .

[552]  H. C. Krueger.  Genoese Trade with Northwest Africa in the Twelfth Century , 1933, Speculum.

[553]  Merchants of Arras and the Overland Trade with Genoa Twelfth Century , 1930 .

[554]  The market for northern textiles in Genoa 1179-1200 , 1929 .

[555]  J. Thompson,et al.  The Cambridge Medieval History , 1927 .

[556]  The early history of bills of lading , 1925 .

[557]  J. R. Commons,et al.  Legal foundations of capitalism , 1925 .

[558]  Wilhelm von Heyd.  Histoire du commerce du Levant au Moyen-Âge , 1923 .

[559]  Eugene H. Byrne.  Genoese Trade with Syria in the Twelfth Century , 1920 .

[560]  G. G. Coulton,et al.  Social Life in Britain from the Conquest to the Reformation , 1918 .

[561]  Jacob Mann.  The responsa of the Babylonian geonim as a source of Jewish history , 1917 .

[562]  T. Veblen.  The Theory of the Leisure Class , 1901 .

[563]  E. Durkheim,et al.  Rules of Sociological Method , 1964 .

[564]  Heinrich Brunner,et al.  Select Pleas in manorial and other seignorial Courts I: reigns of Henry III and Edward I , 1894 .

[565]  A. Marshall,et al.  Principles of Economics , 1890 .

[566]  Johan Caspar Bluntschli.  The theory of the state , 1875 .