A theory of kindness, reluctance, and shame for social preferences

Recent experimental evidence from dictator games suggests that proposers take money from receivers when taking is an option, and that many proposers are reluctant to play the game. This paper proposes a behavioral model with two components: a choice correspondence that depends on the endowed allocation and the menu of allocations available, and a preference ordering over endowment/menu pairs. The choice correspondence governs behavior when the proposer actually plays a game, and the preference ordering governs the proposer's willingness to play a particular game. The model is then used to characterize notions of proposer kindness, reluctance, and shame.

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