Physical random functions

In general, secure protocols assume that participants are able to maintain secret key information. In practice, this assumption is often incorrect as an increasing number of devices are vulnerable to physical attacks. Typical examples of vulnerable devices are smartcards and Automated Teller Machines. To address this issue, Physical Random Functions are introduced. These are Random Functions that are physically tied to a particular device. To show that Physical Random Functions solve the initial problem, it must be shown that they can be made, and that it is possible to use them to provide secret keys for higher level protocols. Experiments with Field Programmable Gate Arrays are used to evaluate the feasibility of Physical Random Functions in silicon. Thesis Supervisor: Srinivas Devadas Title: Professor of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science

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