Approximation and hardness of Shift-Bribery

Abstract In the Shift-Bribery problem we are given an election, a preferred candidate, and the costs of shifting this preferred candidate up the voters' preference orders. The goal is to find such a set of shifts that ensures that the preferred candidate wins the election. We give the first polynomial-time approximation scheme for the Shift-Bribery problem for the case of positional scoring rules, and for the Copeland rule we show strong inapproximability results.

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