论文信息 - Stopping agents from “cheating”

Stopping agents from “cheating”

Abstract When a principal hires two (or more) agents to work in a correlated environment, each agent's reward will depend on the other's performance. Unfortunately, with just the usual optimal (incentive-constrained) contracts being offered, the agents strictly prefer to play equilibrium strategies other than those desired by the principal; they “cheat.” However, the principal can use a more subtle contractual mechanism to stop them from cheating at no extra cost. This mechanism uses one agent to police the other, and exploits certain properties of the optimal contracts.

[1] E. Maskin,et al. The Implementation of Social Choice Rules: Some General Results on Incentive Compatibility , 1979 .

[2] Joel S. Demski,et al. Incentive schemes with multiple agents and bankruptcy constraints , 1988 .

[3] Dilip Mookherjee. Optimal Incentive Schemes with Many Agents , 1984 .

[4] Joel S. Demski,et al. Optimal incentive contracts with multiple agents , 1984 .

[5] C. Ma. Unique Implementation of Incentive Contracts with Many Agents , 1988 .

[6] Thomas R. Palfrey,et al. On Bayesian Implementable Allocations , 1987 .

[7] Andrew Postlewaite,et al. Implementation in differential information economies , 1986 .

[8] E. Maskin,et al. Advances in Economic Theory: The theory of incentives: an overview , 1982 .