It is both a pleasure and an honor to be called upon to address the plenary session. It is hard to believe that the first issue of Management Science came out in October 1954 with the first article by Harold Francis Smiddy-Vice President of General Electric and head of the Management Consulting Services. I learned much from him and I would also like to acknowledge West Churchman, Tjalling Koopmans, George Dantzig, Bill Cooper, Merrill Flood, Tom Cowan, Bob Thrall, Murray Geisler, Charles Hitch, Harlan Mills and Herbert Simon for their influence on my thoughts concerning management science. It is over 32 years since the appearance of Management Science. Prior to coming to this meeting I skimmed all of the issues starting in 1954. This occasion and the Management Science retrospective has caused me to realize that, although some of us keep going with the hope that our best work still lies ahead, the promotion that is guaranteed to all academics is to the rank of extinguished scholar. Before one can theorize usefully, it pays to know a few facts. The knowledge of how to manage an institution does not imply an ability to abstract, generalize, theorize or for that matter even know the facts. The time was ripe for the development of a management science in the 1950s. Growth took place in several locations, as was evinced at both General Electric and in RAND's relationship with the Air Force. In each instance the activity called for a group of scientifically-oriented sheep to study corporate and military wolves with the encouragement of the latter-and amazingly it worked!-possibly because the sponsors paid the bills but did not listen too closely to what their advisors said. The brief written preview of my talk is, to a great extent, an accurate summary of my central theme. Much of what I have to note is an embellishment of the observation that:
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