论文信息 - Doxastic freedom

Doxastic freedom

Compatibilist doxastic freedom Compatibilism entails that our actions and our doxastic attitudes are mostly free. My argument in defense of this claim will be that the compatibility of freedom and causal determination is not obvious; it needs explanation. Various explanations can be offered. If we apply these explanations to our doxastic attitudes, we are going to see that there is little reason to think that our doxastic attitudes are less free than our actions.2

Matthias Steup | M. Steup

[1] Sharon Ryan,et al. Doxastic Compatibilism and the Ethics of Belief , 2003 .

[2] B. Aune. Epistemic justification , 1981 .

[3] M. Steup. Knowledge, Truth, and Duty , 2001 .

[4] P. Strawson. Freedom and Resentment , 1962 .

[5] Jonathan Bennett,et al. Why is belief involuntary , 1990 .

[6] Doxastic decisions and controlling belief , 2006 .

[7] W. Alston,et al. Epistemic Justification: Essays in the Theory of Knowledge.Divine Nature and Human Language: Essays in Philosophical Theology , 1989 .

[8] R. Kane. A Contemporary Introduction to Free Will , 2005 .

[9] Bill Pollard,et al. Explaining Actions With Habits , 2006 .

[10] M. Steup. Doxastic voluntarism and epistemic deontology , 2000 .

[11] S. Wolf,et al. Freedom within Reason , 1990 .

[12] R. Feldman. Voluntary Belief and Epistemic Evaluation , 2001, Contemporary Epistemology.

[13] Harry G. Frankfurt,et al. The importance of what we care about: Freedom of the will and the concept of a person , 1971 .

[14] M. Corrado. Responsibility and Control , 2005 .