Enabling better supply chain decisions through a generic model utilizing cause-effect mapping

Supply chains are critical to delivering components and products safely, affordably, and securely. However, these complex networks of suppliers, manufacturers, and customers are vulnerable to internal and external disruptions and subject to exploitation. This can result in adverse impacts to the system and inhibit value delivery. This paper presents a new generic electronics supply chain model that can reveal information regarding system vulnerabilities and opportunities for decision-makers to intervene. The model draws upon a previously-developed Cause-Effect Mapping (CEM) analytic technique and assists with making decisions affecting complex systems, including those operating in resource-constrained environments. Elements of System Security Engineering (SSE) and Trusted Systems and Networks (TSN) analysis are taken into consideration to provide a greater understanding of security concerns and impacts to a supply chain focusing on electronics for the defense industry. The model, adaptable to a diversity of systems and capable of recognizing non-obvious sources of vulnerability, can be used by systems engineers to provide a holistic view of a complex supply chain. The model facilitates the communication of information regarding supply chain vulnerabilities to decision-makers and other individuals, as described in specific use cases.

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