Government Roles in Evaluation and Arrangement of R&D Consortia

The role of government in forming and coordinating R&D consortia has often been cited in studies of the economic success of latecomer countries such as Korean and Japan. Most previous studies documented the government's efforts to provide funding. In our research about the government's role in determining the quality of innovation, we develop a computational model based on genetic algorithms. The two main aspects of government involvement explored in this study are 1) the timing of evaluation of participating firms in a consortium, and 2) the form that these consortia take. In terms of the timing of evaluation, we find that continuous evaluation is consistently superior to early evaluation. In addition, the effect of the form of the consortium depends on the timing of evaluation. An inverse pyramid arrangement, which emphasizes variation at the beginning of the innovation process, outperforms a pyramid-form arrangement only when evaluation is continuous. We identify the tension and reconciliation between ...

[1]  Mary Tripsas,et al.  Discouraging Opportunistic Behavior in Collaborative R&D: A New Role for Government , 1995 .

[2]  T. Devezas.  Evolutionary theory of technological change: State-of-the-art and new approaches , 2005 .

[3]  Geoffrey E. Hinton,et al.  How Learning Can Guide Evolution , 1996, Complex Syst..

[4]  Elias G. Carayannis,et al.  Strategy, structure, and performance issues of precompetitive R&D consortia: insights and lessons learned from SEMATECH , 2004, IEEE Transactions on Engineering Management.

[5]  Araújo,et al.  An Evolutionary theory of economic change , 1983 .

[6]  Dong-Sung Cho,et al.  Latecomer Strategies: Evidence From the Semiconductor Industry in Japan and Korea , 1998 .

[7]  Chong-Ouk Lee,et al.  The role of the government and R&D infrastructure for technology development , 1988 .

[8]  Daphne Ngar-yin Mah,et al.  The role of the state in sustainable energy transitions: A case study of large smart grid demonstration projects in Japan , 2013 .

[9]  M. Tushman,et al.  Technological Discontinuities and Organizational Environments , 1986 .

[10]  Mariko Sakakibara,et al.  Evaluating government-sponsored R&D consortia in Japan: who benefits and how? , 1997 .

[11]  Daniel E. Goldberg.  The design of innovation: Lessons from genetic algorithms , 1998 .

[12]  Howard E. Aldrich,et al.  R&D consortia in the United States and Japan , 1995 .

[13]  Lee Branstetter,et al.  When Do Research Consortia Work Well and Why? Evidence from Japanese Panel Data , 2000 .

[14]  Daniel A. Levinthal,et al.  Myopia of Selection: Does Organizational Adaptation Limit the Efficacy of Population Selection? , 2007 .

[15]  Yuya Kajikawa,et al.  Structure of knowledge in the science and technology roadmaps , 2008 .

[16]  Boaz Golany,et al.  Bubble Planning and the Mathematics of Consortia , 1999 .

[17]  Jaesun Wang,et al.  Time to get in: The contrasting stories about government interventions in information technology standards (the case of CDMA and IMT-2000 in Korea) , 2007, Gov. Inf. Q..

[18]  Christina Fang,et al.  Balancing Exploration and Exploitation through Structural Design: The Isolation of Subgroups and Organization Learning , 2008 .

[19]  Hyung-Sup Choi.  Science and technology policies for industrialization of developing countries , 1986 .

[20]  John H. Holland,et al.  Adaptation in Natural and Artificial Systems: An Introductory Analysis with Applications to Biology, Control, and Artificial Intelligence , 1992 .

[21]  Mariko Sakakibara.  The Diversity of R&D Consortia and Firm Behavior: Evidence from Japanese Data , 2003 .

[22]  Chang Woo Kim,et al.  The innovation policy of nanotechnology development and convergence for the new Korean government , 2013, Journal of Nanoparticle Research.

[23]  Daniel A. Levinthal,et al.  Exploration and Exploitation in Organizational Learning , 2007 .