暂无分享,去创建一个
Tao Lin | Xiaotie Deng | Ron Lavi | Xiang Yan | Qi Qi | Wenwei Wang | Xiaotie Deng | R. Lavi | Xiang Yan | Qi Qi | Tao Lin | Wenwei Wang
[1] Or Sattath,et al. Redesigning Bitcoin’s Fee Market , 2017, ACM Trans. Economics and Comput..
[2] Yuval Peres,et al. Perfect Bayesian Equilibria in Repeated Sales , 2014, SODA.
[3] Yang Cai,et al. Multi-Item Mechanisms without Item-Independence: Learnability via Robustness , 2019, EC.
[4] Richard Cole,et al. The sample complexity of revenue maximization , 2014, STOC.
[5] Chenghao Guo,et al. Settling the sample complexity of single-parameter revenue maximization , 2019, STOC.
[6] Tim Roughgarden,et al. Revenue maximization with a single sample , 2010, EC '10.
[7] Jinyan Liu,et al. Learning Optimal Reserve Price against Non-myopic Bidders , 2018, NeurIPS.
[8] Anna R. Karlin,et al. Competitive auctions , 2006, Games Econ. Behav..
[9] Claudio Gentile,et al. Ieee Transactions on Information Theory 1 Regret Minimization for Reserve Prices in Second-price Auctions , 2022 .
[10] Jason D. Hartline,et al. Sample Complexity for Non-Truthful Mechanisms , 2016, EC.
[11] Hamid Nazerzadeh,et al. Incentive-Compatible Learning of Reserve Prices for Repeated Auctions , 2019, WWW.
[12] Mehryar Mohri,et al. Learning Theory and Algorithms for revenue optimization in second price auctions with reserve , 2013, ICML.
[13] Jacob Abernethy,et al. Learning Auctions with Robust Incentive Guarantees , 2019, NeurIPS.
[14] S. Matthew Weinberg,et al. Selling to a No-Regret Buyer , 2017, EC.
[15] Nikhil R. Devanur,et al. Online Auctions and Multi-scale Online Learning , 2017, EC.
[16] Vahab Mirrokni,et al. A Robust Non-Clairvoyant Dynamic Mechanism for Contextual Auctions , 2019, NeurIPS.
[17] Vahab S. Mirrokni,et al. Incentive-Aware Learning for Large Markets , 2018, WWW.
[18] Maria-Florina Balcan,et al. Reducing mechanism design to algorithm design via machine learning , 2007, J. Comput. Syst. Sci..
[19] Andrew Chi-Chih Yao,et al. An Incentive Analysis of some Bitcoin Fee Designs , 2018, ICALP.
[20] Eric Budish,et al. Strategy-Proofness in the Large , 2017, The Review of Economic Studies.
[21] Adel Javanmard,et al. Dynamic Incentive-Aware Learning: Robust Pricing in Contextual Auctions , 2018, NeurIPS.
[22] Vahab S. Mirrokni,et al. Optimal marketing strategies over social networks , 2008, WWW.
[23] Tim Roughgarden,et al. On the Pseudo-Dimension of Nearly Optimal Auctions , 2015, NIPS.
[24] Nikhil R. Devanur,et al. The sample complexity of auctions with side information , 2015, STOC.
[25] S. Matthew Weinberg,et al. The Sample Complexity of Up-to-ε Multi-Dimensional Revenue Maximization , 2018, 2018 IEEE 59th Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science (FOCS).
[26] Tim Roughgarden,et al. Making the Most of Your Samples , 2014, EC.
[27] Nicole Immorlica,et al. Repeated Sales with Multiple Strategic Buyers , 2017, EC.
[28] Umar Syed,et al. Learning Prices for Repeated Auctions with Strategic Buyers , 2013, NIPS.
[29] Roger B. Myerson,et al. Optimal Auction Design , 1981, Math. Oper. Res..
[30] Avrim Blum,et al. Near-optimal online auctions , 2005, SODA '05.
[31] Umar Syed,et al. Repeated Contextual Auctions with Strategic Buyers , 2014, NIPS.
[32] Moshe Babaioff,et al. Are Two (Samples) Really Better Than One? , 2018, EC.