论文信息 - The Role of Fixed Fee and Royalty in Patent Licensing

The Role of Fixed Fee and Royalty in Patent Licensing

We consider a monopolistic screening model of patent licensing. There is one patentee and one licensee and the patentee wishes to sell a patent of cost reducing technology to the licensee. The patentee is an outsider and the licensee is the only firm in the product market. The licensee possesses private information about the market demand which is unknown to the patentee except for some prior belief about it. In this scenario, we find the linear optimal licensing contract.

Sougata Poddar | Uday Bhanu Sinha

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